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INTRODUCTION 

The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (lA TTC) came into existence in 1950, after its conven­
tion, signed by representatives ofCosta Rica and the United States in 1949, was ratified. It was the first 
international tuna organization, and only the third international fisheries organization, whose staff has had 
the responsibility for performing scientific research, the others being the International Pacific Halibut 
Commission, established in 1923, and the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, established 
in 1937. The current members of the IATTC are Costa Rica, Ecuador, EI Salvador, France, Guatemala, 
Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. The first Director of the 
IATTC was Dr. Milner B. Schaefer, who was in that position from 1950 to 1963. He was followed by Dr. 
John L. Kask (1963-1969), Dr. James Joseph (1969-1999), and Dr. Robin L. Allen (1999-present). 
The success of the IATIC showed that it was possible to carry out research and management on an inter­
national, high-seas fishery successfully. Since then other international organizations for tuna manage­
ment, including the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (1969), the Forum 
Fisheries Agency (1979), the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (1994), and the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (1996), were established. 
Appropriately, the 50th anniversary celebration was held in Costa Rica, one of the two charter members 
of the IATTC. Persons who have held important positions in international fishery management in various 
parts ofthe world spoke at the celebration. Their presentations, except for that describing the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission, are reproduced in this volume. 
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A GLOBAL PERSPECTNE TO FISHERIES FOR HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES AND 

THEIR MANAGEMENT: THE ADDITIONAL STANDARDS PROVIDED FOR REGIONAL 

BODIES BY THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE UN FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT 

J.F. Caddy, Research Fellow, 
Imperial College, London, and 
CINVEST A V, Merida, Mexico 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The situatiou of glohal resources and marine ecosystems 
Before looking at the question of how tuna fishery management fits with the legal instruments mentioned 
in the title of this paper, it would seem to be a good idea to briefly review the situation of marine fisheries 
as we find it today, and ask whether tuna fisheries are showing similar trends to other resources. In recent 
years considerable concern has been expressed over the declines in landings of key fish species globally, 
with a number of reviews (e.g. FAO 1997, Caddy et al. 1999, Caddy and Garibaldi, 2000), pointing to the 
fact that for many key F AO areas, landings of marine species have already peaked as early as the 1970's 
in some areas and have since been falling, with particular concern for groundfish resources of continental 
shelves. 
Here we are seeing a move offshore of fleets into deeper water previously thought to be unfishable to take 
orange roughy and other long-lived species in a move that is almost certainly not going to be sustainable. 
Voices were raised in alarm by Pauly et al. (1998), who see 'fishing down of the food web' as a global 
threat, whereby top predators (and these include tunas) are depleted and replaced by species lower in the 
food web such as sardines or anchovies (or presumably, in the case of offshore tuna resources, frigate tu­
nas, squid and mesopelagic fish). In a recent review of fisheries trends by trophic category, Caddy and 
Garibaldi (2000) found evidence in some systems to support the 'fishing down the foodweb' hypothesis 
especially for groundfish stocks of temperate shelves, but also pointed to other driving factors such as 
technological improvements, changes in market preference, as well as in some areas, increases in produc­
tivity of marine coastal waters due to increased nutrient runoff to marine coastal ecosystems (e.g. Caddy 
\993a). For tropical areas outside upwelling zones, tunas make up the majority ofpiscivores, and as can 
be seen from fig 1, their landings have increased dramatically over recent decades: does this mean that 
tuna fisheries are destabilizing oceanic ecosystems? The definitive answer to this question remains unan­
swered, but certainly there are ecological problems to be faced, as discussed next. 
Impacts of tuna fISheries on the ecosystem 
The Code (F AO 1995a) has twenty or more exhortations to do something to conserve the health and well­
being of ecosystems, but really we have no operational definitions of what is to be aimed for apart from a 
collection of single species targets. How relevant are ecosystem considerations to the status of tuna 
stocks? Certainly there is evidence of serious depletion of bluefin tuna stocks and rates of exploitation of 
other tunas would better be reduced, certainly for economic reasons and most probably for stock conser­
vation and ecological reasons also. The general picture from the landings record (fig I) for tropical areas 
outside upwelling zones, is of a more recent rise in landings which has increased the mean trophic level of 
all marine catches from some tropical areas over recent years since tunas now make up a higher propor­
tion of the total. 
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FIGURE 1. Trends in catches broken down by trophic category (left axis) and in total landings (right 
axis) for F AO Tropical Areas 31, 51, 57, and 71 outside upwelling zones (from Caddy and Garibaldi, 
2000). 
The question may be asked whether the reduction in tuna stocks from virgin conditions implied by fishing 
at around MSY in some cases, is likely to lead to an expansion of food organisms at the lower trophic 
levels that support tuna stocks? I believe the answer may be yes, but that most of these food organisms 
such as oceanic squids, and other scombrids, are unlikely to be available to exploitation by man in an 
economic manner: tuna stocks are the only marketable schooling resources providing convenient large 
'packages' of protein for funneling oceanic production to man in a commercially and technologically fea­
sible fashion, though this may conceivably change with technology and market conditions. 
Olson and Boggs (1986) estimated that at least 11,690 tonnes of prey were consumed daily by the popula­
tion ofyell owfi n tuna in the CYRA during 1970-1972, mainly by frigate tunas (especially Auxis), or 
about 1.4 million tonnes a year ofthis species. Reducing the stocks ofyellowfin drastically would in­
crease stocks ofAuxis, which is believed to eat, among other things, yellowfin tunajuveniles. If this is 
correct, reducing tuna biomass significantly could in theory reduce yellowfin recruitment! To the con­
trary, fishing Auxis might reduce somewhat tuna food supplies, but would almost certainly be economi­
cally inefficient. Other tuna food items such as squid and mesopelagic fish are also marginally harvestable 
offshore, so that a 'food cushion' appears to exist for tunas. Thus, the main threat to tuna fisheries from 
changes in the offshore food web seems to be to allow Auxis populations to grow, by reducing tuna stocks 
to a low level. 
One other aspect of tuna ecology is beyond the reach of tuna managers, if you consider that tunas 
horizontally integrate biological production from both oceanic food chains (where we have seen that their 
food resources are relatively secure from exploitation) but also harvest shelf resources which are subject 
both to overfishing and more extreme environmental changes than ocean systems. While chaos theory 
seems to show that the whole subject of forecasting ecosystem changes as a result of fishing or environ­
mental changes is largely wishful thinking at this stage, and while I cannot see overfishing of shelf prey 
species as having an overriding impact on tuna stocks, I can see the possibility of EOSO phenomena (e.g., 
Bakun 1996) and possibly even global warming, impacting ocean systems and affecting tuna distribution 
and abundance, but would not wish to hazard a guess in which direction. One interesting phenomenon 
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that might be worth commenting on, is the (I understand) higher proportion of blue fin catch recorded by 
ICCAT which have been taken from the Mediterranean as opposed to the Atlantic in recent years, which 
suggests that feeding conditions in the former area are better, and we know that cultural eutrophication 
has increased forage fish abundance there, which could be the reason. 
With respect to assessment of the tuna resources, we see the development of ever more sophisticated 
modelling approaches (e.g. SPARCLE, Fournier et al. 1996), but apparently slow progress is being made 
in estimating life history parameters as input for tuna assessment models. For example, the value for the 
natural mortality rates (M) used for yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack all come from old estimates, and in 
some cases from other oceanic areas. In my view, new modelling techniques and management measures, 
in addition to effort and catch controls, need to take more explicitly into account dispersal and migration 
rates, and ensure through spatially differentiated exploitation patterns that adequate escapement to spawn­
ing is assured. 
Ifwe consider the broad picture however, for many small tuna species and tuna-like resources or other 
highly migratory species, there is currently insufficient information to arrive at an assessment or a scien­
tifically-based management system. If we consider the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, where tuna fisher­
ies come under jurisdiction of ICC AT, there seems to have been a trend of increasing fishing capacity in 
the countries of the WECAFC (Western Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission) regulatory area (Mahon 
1996). Several species such as blackfin tuna, king and Spanish mackerel, and dolphin fish are of major 
importance, and increasing trends in landings are evident, but their by-catch in tuna fisheries goes largely 
unreported. Interactions between large scale commercial, small scale artisanal and recreational fisheries 
will inevitably intensify as Small Island Developing States (SIDS) demand their share of ocean produc­
tion. 
This brings to mind Article 5.2 of the Code which says (inter alia) ... 'relevant international organiza­
tions ... should give full recognition to the special circumstances and requirements of developing coun­
tries, including in particular the least developed among them, and small island developing countries', 
while Articles 24 and 25 of the Fish Stock Agreement specify that these special requirements include their 
need to meet nutritional requirements, to avoid impacts (by high seas harvesting) on artisanal fishers har­
vesting the same resource, and the provision of financial and other assistance, including assisting their 
active participation in fishery management organizations. It must be seen that the question of how these 
requirements can be achieved while restricting access to avoid overfishing, becomes a serious one, and 
will be discussed later. 
A short review of the current situation of distant water fisheries 
Newton (1999) notes that distant water catches in 1972 made up 16% of total marine catches, but had 
dropped to 4% by 1995, and that in many areas, distant water fleet operations had been replaced by 
coastal state fleets. Despite this decline, the capacity of distant water fleets has not been reduced: a ques­
tion we will discuss later. 
In fact, over recent years tuna fisheries have increased greatly in importance from 20% of high sea 
catches and 45% of value, to 41 % of catches and 82% of total landed value of high seas catches - in other 
words, tuna fisheries are the most important high seas fisheries today, and the others are ofrelatively mi­
nor economic importance in value terms. It is for this reason that we will consider in a broad-brush fash­
ion the economics ofthe offshore fishery in what follows. 
The overcapitalization issue 
As noted by Greboval and Munro (1999), excess fishing capacity is affecting the sustainability of many 
fisheries, undermining management efforts and leading to economic waste, and tuna fisheries are not ex­
cluded from this generalization. They note that over the decades 1970-90, world fishing capacity grew at 
a rate eight times greater than the growth of landings. F AO Technical guideline No 4 for Responsible 
fisheries, an adjunct to the code on fisheries management issues notes that 'It is ... in the interests ofthe 
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users and the resource to maintain potential fishing capacity at a level commensurate with the long term 
stock productivity'. As noted earlier, unfortunately this is a state that is rarely realised for reasons we will 
discuss further. 
It is perhaps relevant here to recall that Smith and Hanna (1990) divided fishing capacity into four com­
ponents: 
a) Number of vessels 

b) Size of vessel 

c) Technical efficiency ofoperation 

d) Potential fishing time per year. 

My general impression is that in terms of managing capacity of high seas fishing fleets, attention has been 
mainly paid to the first two factors, and less so to the other two. 
Greboval and Munro (1999) distinguish between pure open access fisheries and regulated open access 
fisheries: tuna fisheries perhaps fit into both categories. Each has ill-defined property rights, but the sec­
ond type, which probably includes some of the better managed tuna fisheries, although controlling the 
overall global harvest, rarely are able to exert effective control over vessel participation in the fishery. 
Newton (1999) notes that the most accessible information on high seas fisheries are those for tuna, where 
ICCA T, IA TIC, IOTC and the South Pacific Commission collect data on catches and tuna vessels. Im­
proved coordination between tuna commissions would be a precondition to a proper analysis of global 
overcapacity of tuna fleets, given that some boats may fish (legally or illegally) in more than one commis­
sion area in a single trip. He referred to the concept of a world tuna body or umbrella organization, an 
idea floated without success by IATTC at the F AO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing (F AO 
1992), where the response, unfortunately, from other participants was that "this was an issue that lay out­
side its (the Consultation's) competence, and that the consultation recognized that 'regional fisheries bod­
ies were responsible to their members' ". Given this attitude, the advantages of the Compliance Agree­
ment as a management tool become readily evident: as for the 1995 UN Fish Stock Agreement, it requires 
flag states to license their vessels operating on the high seas and maintain a record of authorized vessels. 
This record will be updated and made available from F AO electronically as soon as the agreement goes 
into effect, so that the existing global capacity can then be determined. 
While it serves little purpose to weep for an idea whose time has not yet come, such an international um­
brella organization for tuna commissions with the Compliance Agreement mechanism incorporated, could 
at the very minimum, serve a useful coordinating, and information-furnishing role. In fact the secretariats 
of tuna commissions have already initiated a process ofconsultation that will serve to exchange informa­
tion. One would like to add that it would also be useful for setting uniform standards of acceptance of new 
members, and might eventually provide a coordination mechanism for regional Satellite Tracking Sys­
tems, to be discussed next. The fundamental obstacle for most regional bodies to reaching agreement not 
only on conservation measures but also on measures to coordinate the work of different commissions, is 
not only their different membership, but the requirement for participants to adopt measures unanimously 
by concensus. Very little likelihood ofchange is going to occur in the absence ofan improbable step for­
ward in assigning access or stakeholders rights to users of high seas resources. 
The other element of the overcapitalization issue that deserves mention relates to the question of technol­
ogy dumping. A fleet that sells its older vessels to new participants while upgrading its own, ensures that 
the total capacity of the regional fleet can only increase. When we add to this the advantages in economic 
terms of operating older vessels under flags of convenience, and the arms-length distance this provides 
from actually implementing fisheries agreements reached by Commissions, we see the seductive logic of 
not keeping capacity under control. Additional pressures on fleet caps are added to by incentives provided 
to support ship building, when from a conservation perspective, incentives to scrap older vessels would be 
much more appropriate. In fact, in an analysis of all vessels over 100 tons in the global fishing fleet 
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within the Lloyd's data base (Smith 1999) shows that the peak years ofconstruction were in the 20 years 
from 1968-88, (no separate data provided for tuna fishing boats unfortunately). 
Considering that industrial fishing vessels seem to have an effective half-life for operation of some 30+ 
years (Caddy 1993), we have been living recently on 'fossil investment' from the 1960's to 1980's, but 
may soon expect global fleet renewal to become more intensively pursued, especially since with rising 
fuel prices globally, obsolescence of less efficient older vessels will be accelerated. Smith (1999) goes 
into more detail on this issue, and notes that fleet reduction due to vessel losses occurs at about 1.5% per 
year for the first 25 years, and due to decommissioning and losses at 60% per year over the remainder of 
their life span. One can only hope with Newton (1999) that fisheries commissions will bring up the issue 
of the suitable replacement coefficients to be used for offsetting increased technological efficiency when 
major rebuilding programs begin. 
Tuna fisberies req uire international management 
The problem of fisheries management for highly migratory resources transcends the already complicated 
problem faced in managing demersal and small pelagic resources, namely that of establishing the state of 
resources, quotas and technical measures, but different government processes and different interests of 
countries also need to be taken into account. 
There is a need to obtain international agreement (in some cases on the science as well as on the man­
agement measures) which makes management ofhighly migratory resources far more difficult than that 
ofnational resources, and hence complicates the process of agreeing on effective and binding measures. 
Some progress is being made however, and new perspectives and mechanisms are being developed. For 
example, the ICCA T Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program is a trade measure designed to improve 
compliance with ICCA T Resolutions by prohibiting imports of bluefin unless accompanied by a certifi­
cate saying that the fish caught met with ICCAT conservation measures. ICCAT has also taken the lead 
with respect to implementing specific measures against countries fishing Atlantic bluefin tuna through its 
BFT Action plan, which under Recommendations 96-11 and 96-12 prohibits import of blue fin and prod­
ucts from 3 states operating: 'in a manner that diminishes the effectiveness ofICCAT regulations' 
Given that the main importing country is Japan, an active ICCA T member, this measures has the potential 
for success. 
Nonetheless, the difficulties facing tuna commissions in achieving agreements ofmembers and non­
members is noteworthy. An example is provided by ICCA T Resolution 95-3 on Compliance, an extract of 
which reads" Satellite tracking and catch reporting systems under the responsibility of flag states should 
be encouraged". The point here that even an active Commission is not being given an operational role in 
actively implementing and policing resolutions by its members. 
Tbe relevance of tbe CCRF agreement, tbe UN Fisb Stocks Agreement and tbe Compliance Agree­
ment to tuna fisberies 
The pace with which these new management agreements have been accepted and applied by coastal 
states, in the latter two cases despite a lack of ratification, is gratifYing and surprising. They all provide 
useful directions and embody an often sophisticated common understanding of the complexities and prac­
ticalities of fisheries. Given that the general thrust of these agreements is highly positive, I believe the 
most useful approach to my terms of reference for this talk is to consider how the Code ofConduct and 
UN Fish Stock Agreement can accommodate the particular features of tuna fisheries, as far as their man­
agement is concerned, and what difficulties their application faces. 
The story of how the UN Fish Stock Agreement was harmonized with the Code of Conduct during their 
largely contemporaneous development does not require telling here, but simply to note that the two in­
struments are compatible as far as they deal with Highly Migratory resources, and that both of them con­
tain essential elements of that other legal instrument, the Compliance Agreement This now looks to be 
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gaining a further lease of life with proposals for adding extra provisions governing satellite monitoring 
systems; a high priority in my view for all distant-water fisheries, which without this technology are 
largely unmonitorable. 
Certainly, the global nature of the F AO Code means that a number of Articles, such as that on coastal area 
management are of doubtful relevance to most tuna fisheries. Even within Article 7 which deals with 
fisheries management, there are issues which are more particular to EEZ management, and although rele­
vant to management of domestic and inshore tuna resources, should not be overemphasized in a global 
context. 
One of the considerations that needs to be borne in mind in translating the Code into an operational series 
of actions is that due to its development by governments, it has come to resemble a code of conduct for 
governments, which needs to be interpreted anew at each level: that of the fishing enterprise, the fleet and 
the individual skipper involved in interpreting its provisions. Although now accepted by many govern­
ments, the Code's provisions are more persuasive than binding. How the Code is to be applied in the case 
of tuna fisheries remains an open question, and this paper can only highlight particular aspects. Certainly 
one ofthe roles of the tuna commissions will be to consider how key clauses of the instruments men­
tioned can be brought to the attention ofthe tuna industry, and translated into a form whereby their practi­
cal implications are more easily understandable. 
As noted by Newton (1999), although Article 17 of the Fish Stock Agreement states that members of such 
organizations "shall take measures consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter activities 
of such vessels which undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management measures" it is not 
specified what international action will lead non-cooperating states to revoke authorizations of their ves­
sels to fish. Although Article 20 para 4 urges cooperation between states to identifY vessels reported to 
have undermined regional conservation measures, other than blacklisting, it is not obvious what action 
can be taken. The Compliance Agreement with a proposed 24 hour access to a world list of authorizations 
to fish seems to provide the basic tool to at least ascertain, without boarding, whether a vessel has the re­
quired authorization to fish in the area in question. 
Tbe code and fisbery economics 
One other aspect of the Code and Fish Stock Agreement that causes perplexity at first sight,relates to the 
almost complete absence or specific mention of economic considerations, which surely underlie fisheries 
for tunas as for other resources. One particular drawback here is that it is very difficult to use any eco­
nomic or tax measure internationally in tuna fishery management This seems to be because in spite of the 
undoubted efficiency of these mechanisms in other domains, not all countries participating in high seas 
fisheries share similar costs, market values, or similar perceptions of the importance of access to fishing 
grounds for food security or other political ends, nor is there a regulatory body with the power to impose 
taxes. For the same general reason, we have seen few application of rights-based methods such as ITQ's 
in tuna fisheries, since for obvious reasons, the definition of • stakeholders' and an identification of their 
rights to fish, is still submerged in the global commons of the high seas where many tuna fisheries oper­
ate. 
One might for example have supposed that the knowledge that maximum economic yield (MEY) exists at 
a lower level of fishing than MSY, in a more rational world, might have led to a clause in one ofthe 
above instruments such as: 
"All participants, whether fishing for a straddling or highly migratory resource inside EEZ's or on the 
high seas, should seek to avoid wastage ofeconomic resources by prior negotiation of a fair share of al­
lowable production. This can alternatively be expressed in terms ofthe fleet capacity or the total fishing 
power needed to harvest their share." 
Probably the equitable negotiation ofallocations by fleets and by nations is the most difficult aspect cur­
rently faced by international fisheries, even for shared stocks when the number of parties involved is 
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known, and new approaches are desperately needed (e.g. Caddy 1996). It becomes an even more intracta­
ble problem where an undefined number of potential new entrants must be taken into account. The other 
major obstacle is that national fleets do not share common economic systems, hence an allocation of a 
TAC which would produce a net benefit to one, might lead to an economic loss for another. It would also 
seem misleading to suppose that fishing fleets are necessarily and exclusively seeking monetary return ­
in fact for many fleets direct or indirect subsidies make it difficult to judge their economic performance. 
Indirect benefits of a high seas fishery in terms of projected political and economic influence for the gov­
ernment concerned, in maintaining its influence in an area, or ensuring that their industry provide for food 
security even at a loss to the sector, may both override purely economic considerations. 
One ofthe few clauses of the Code specifically mentioning economics is 7.4.3, which reads: 
"Studies should be promoted which provide an understanding of the costs, benefits and effects of alterna­
tive management options ... in particular, options related to excess fishing capacity and excessive levels of 
fishing effort." 
Note that this falls far short of saying that capacity should be curtailed, or that fisheries should be oper­
ated in an economically efficient fashion. This was a question examined recently at an F AO meeting on 
the management of fishing capacity, held in October 1998 (F AO 1999), which identified this as one of the 
key questions to be addressed by fishery commissions. 
Evidently, as noted by section 7.2.2b ofthe Code on Management Objectives, managing resources in an 
open access situation, or one where allocations have not been fixed, presents major difficulties, but as an 
observer ofthe process, it is my impression that neither the Code nor the Fish Stock Agreement provide a 
water-tight seal against increases ofeffort or access. 
Article 10 of the UN Fish Stock Agreement, under' Functions of subregional and regional fisheries man­
agement organizations and arrangements', clause (b), says that States "shall agree, as appropriate, on par­
ticipatory rights such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort", while clause (i) rec­
ommends States to: "agree on the means by which the fishing interests of new members of, or participants 
in, the organization or arrangement will be accommodated". 
Under Article )) on new members or participants, clause (a) urges that the state of stocks and existing 
level of effort should be considered, but under clauses (d) and (e), it states that the needs of coastal fishing 
communities mainly dependent on fishing the resources, and (f), the interests of developing states in 
whose jurisdiction the stocks also occur, must also be taken into account. How are these clauses to be op­
erationalized without destroying the cap on total fishing pressure we are seeking? 
The impression this gives to a person such as myself trained in stock assessment, is of a certain 'elastic­
ity' in the concept of sustainable yield that underlies these proposed arrangements. It is not stated any­
where that existing participants must relinquish some of the Total Allowable Catch (T AC) or equivalent 
fleet fishing power or capacity in order to provide for these valid considerations, but this surely must be 
the case? 
The problem identified from an economic perspective by Greboval and Munro (1999) is that there exist at 
least two types of 'Capital' relevant to fisheries: the existing biomass of fish forms the natural capital, 
which if properly maintained will yield a stream of benefits to society indefinitely. The other more obvi­
ous form of capital are those economic resources invested in the fleet. They point out that management 
failures come when these two sources of capita) are not in balance or equilibrium with each other, or 
where there is excessive mobility of fleet capital between different resources. I presume by this latter 
qualification, they mean that this could lead to 'pulse fishing' and 'rotational depletion' of unit resources 
fished in succession by the same fleets. 
One other implication (or lost opportunity) resulting from excessive fleet development is illustrated by the 
record tuna catches last year, which are reported to have seriously depressed markets recently. This sug-
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gests another good reason for global coordination in putting a cap on capacity at the level of tuna indus­
tries. Though the likelihood ofagreement on a 'cartel' restricting global tuna catches to keep prices high 
seems even more remote than for the other 'global umbrella' for cooperation mentioned earlier, the impli­
cation is that net revenues would rise if global effort fell. In this connection, a coordinated response to the 
ecocertification of tuna products (e.g. Deere 1999) could also have a useful role to play in supplanting 
over-simplistic concepts as 'dolphin-safe' labelling of tuna products. At the same time, both market­
driven mechanisms suggest that indicative bioeconomic analyses could be very useful in reinforcing the 
advantages of fishing at a reference point significantly below that yielding MSY. 
Some shared and straddling stock issues 
The need for cooperation between authorities of coastal states for shared stocks (see Hancock 1999) and 
between coastal and DWFN's for straddling and highly migratory resources, is stressed in the Code and 
the UN Fish Stock Agreement. What comes out very clearly from 'competitive fish games' and their 
modelling (see e.g. McKelvey 1985) is that if there hasn't been a prior agreement on allocations and on 
cooperation, the overcapitalization problem will arise and will prove intractable, since all parties will have 
capacity in excess ofthat needed This leads to short term competitive games in which participants try to 
payoff investment in vessels before seeking agreement, and this inevitably leads to stock depletion. 
Ruseski (1997) suggests that this is precisely why there is a powerful motivation for subsidy programmes, 
in that there is a race to seize a greater share of the temporary profits from a fishery before the stock is 
depleted. 
In the 1979 book on International Management ofTuna by Joseph and Greenough and in Joseph's 1983 
article "International Tuna Management Revisited" (in Global Fisheries Perspectives for the 1980s, edited 
by Rothschild) suggest new approaches to rationalizing tuna fisheries. Clearly the idea of limiting access 
to international fisheries by conventional 'top-down' governmental mechanisms with national allocation 
either frozen in time or subject to change by negotiation, is the conventional way to go, but hasn't proved 
very practical judging from the relatively few such agreements that appear to be in force. 
Are there other approaches? The notion of a joint company with shares held by countries is seductive and 
has some similarities to the PAQ system suggested by Joseph and Greenough (1979). Such a joint com­
pany might have shares held by the countries involved or their fishing industries may be directly involved 
with the governments as guarantors? 
Shares might be negotiated initially both in terms ofestablished national allocations of the resource or in 
capacity units, and could be partly based on catch but also on the extent ofnational contributions to the 
joint arrangement. Such shares could be traded between participants on a temporary or longer term basis. 
As noted, such a parastatal company could be partly or wholly in the private sector under supervision by 
the States concerned, paying dividends to participating States or their private sectors either directly or as 
licence fees or taxes, and preferably also paying the costs of fisheries research and MCS for this and other 
resources. Where necessary, this para statal body could also licence national vessels of participating coun­
tries for harvesting, or agree to joint ventures of various kinds without the pressure that the benefits are 
seen as going to only one economy. This kind of arrangement might offer other additional advantages 
through bulk purchase of vessels, fishing gear and equipment abroad at favourable rates, allow joint ad­
vertising and marketing of product, and pay for vessel and fishermen insurance schemes etc. 
Thus, the idea of, for example, a 'Pacific Ocean Living Resources Consortium' presupposes participants 
get a proportion of the established TAC or total allowed fishing capacity by paying a share towards the 
costs ofadministration of the Consortium. It would be nice to suggest that countries bid in open auction 
for catch or capacity shares, but this would result in the richer countries getting most of the pie, which we 
have seen is not in line with the Code or Fish Stock Agreement provisions for protecting developing 
countries. Something of potential relevance is currently being negotiated by the 22 member countries of 
the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM), to fund its activities (GFCM 1999), which 
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could present some useful ideas for a system for allocating tuna resources. The GFCM scheme proposes a 
scale of contributions made up of three parts; a basic fee (about $3-4000 per country), a catch component 
making up 60% ofthe budget, and a Gross National Product (GNP) component making up the remainder. 
Poorer countries would end up paying relatively less than rich ones. A comparable (and purely hypotheti­
cal!) scheme for sharing a global TAC or Capacity Ceiling would be for country (i) to receive a share as 
follows: 
Share (ofcatch2) = 0.75 * TAC *[Recent national tuna catch (i)/Total recent catches] + 
0.25 * TAC* [X(i)/ Sum ofX(i)'s] 
- where for country i, XCi) = [(Highest GNP of member countries) GNP (i)] 
Other indices than GNP could of course be used, and the GFCM is debating whether the contribution to 
the F AO or the UN budget might be preferable to GNP, and certainly other indices can be envisaged us­
ing the same general principle. 
Use the 'best scientific advice available' or 'precaution'? 
These two phrases summarize the 'sea change' in perception that has occurred between the Law of the 
Sea and the recent legal instruments we are discussing. The first phrase from the LOS occurs at least 6 
times in the Code, under General Principles (6.4), in the first clause of Article 7.1.1 (Fisheries Manage­
ment), 7.2.1 under Management Objectives, 7.3.1 Management Framework and Procedures, 7.4.1 Data 
Gathering and Management Advice, and under article 7.5.3 where we first see the emergence of the pre­
cautionary approach. At first reading, this would seem to suggest an emphasis on science as a necessary 
basis for making decisions, while only secondarily, "the absence of adequate scientific information should 
not be used as a reason for posponing or failing to take conservation and management measures" - Article 
7.5. 
[n the UN Fish Stock Agreement (UN 1995), the precautionary approach appears 'up front' so to speak, 
right after 'General Principles' where it is mentioned specifically, thus suggesting that this principle be 
given prominence. Perhaps this is appropriate, given that the possibilities of obtaining accurate, timely 
and detailed scientific information as a basis for management decisions is less likely for high sea fisheries 
than for inshore or national fisheries. Article 6 enjoins states to be cautious when making decisions in in­
formation-sparse environments, and first introduces the theme of stock-specific reference points. Annex II 
to the Agreement takes this further, developing what has become one of the more operational aspects of 
precaution, namely the division into target and limit reference points suggested in a background paper to 
the conference (later expanded as Caddy and Mahon 1995). Thus, in addition to taking uncertainty on size 
and productivity of stocks, the level of fishing and environmental considerations into account, States 
should develop specific reference points for these criteria. 
Limit reference points, fisheries control laws and management plans 
One ofthe aspects of these new or limit reference points (LRP' s), in the case of MSY, is that 'when ap­
proached, they should not be exceeded' - as opposed to the older use of MSY as a target reference point, 
where the error the fishery realized in attempting to control fishing effort so as to 'hit' this target, could be 
as much as ± 30%; where the '+30%' could, and often did, have negative effects that were not easily re­
versible. 
2 A similar approach could be applied to capacity. The 75:25 division is purely for purposes of 
illustration. 
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TABLE 1. Level, change, and structure indicators of fishery subsystems (modified from Seijo and 
Caddy, 2000) 
Level indicators Chan e indicators Structure indicators 
Resource 
• Recruitment, RI Seasonal recru it- Recruitment trends Distribution of recruits, 
• ~iomass, Bt ment Trend in B/Boo ratio Distribn. of biomass, 
• Spawning biomass SI 
• Total mortality Zt 
Current B/Boo 
Current S/Bt 
Current level of Zt 
Trends in S/BI ratio 
Changes in Zr 
Distribn of spawners. 
Age- and space-specific 
total mortality 
Resource users 
• Plant & fleet invest- Current rate of fleet Trends in fishery investment Age composition of the 
ments investment fleets 
Trends in gear, navigation 
Catchability & se- Technology and changes in ir Fleet specific fishing 
• Fishing power lectivity catchabilityl selectivity power 
• Fishing effort Fishing days Trends in allocation of fish- Fleet specific effort 
ing days to the target Indices of spatial effort 
species concentration 
• Costs Unit cost of effort Changes in costs of fishing Fleet specific unit cost of 
Variable costs over Changes in transfer costs effort. 
catch rate from port to fishing 
Transfer costs/total grounds 
costs 
• Revenues Revenues per unit Changes in real prices of Fleet specific revenues per 
of effort species and sizes. unit of effort. 
• Rent Rent per unit of Present value of rent with Fishery rent distribution 
effort different prices of time between fleets. 
Resource managers 
• A Management plan? 
• Enforcement and Current rate of in- Trends of compliance Distribution of costs and 
rights allocation fringements or Trends of self-policing benefits of fishery man-
of annual sei­ agement 
zures and 
prosecutions 
• Benefit/cost of fishery 
regulation Enforcement costs 
Information costs 
Rate of increase in the num­
ber of fishermen 
Rate of increase in the num-
Changes in resource use 
rules 
Number of active ber of free riders (i. e. 
fishermen/ non-contributing users) 
boats 
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A simple precautionary decision rule to illustrate the idea, might be one that says that: 'Evidence of in­
creased stock size will only allow a maximum of (say) 10% increased effort or catch in a year, but evi­
dence ofdecreasing stock size will lead to an immediate (say) 25% drop in TAC or effort'. Under such a 
decision rule, although optimum economic yield might not be achieved in many years, it is unlikely that 
any but the most serious disaster will lead to stock collapse. 
One comment I must make on this issue that I have had the opportunity to make at other fishery commis­
sions such as NAFO, is the negative influence resulting from scientific efforts to develop only one or two 
very sophisticated reference points, as seemed the case until recently for ICES and NAFO, based on 
spawning success in previous years. Apart from requiring a large research effort to update the data series 
the LRP is based upon, it is 'putting too many eggs in one basket', and in addition is not easily explained 
to fishermen and industry. 
A more recent approach stems from the F AO technical consultation on the precautionary approach held in 
Sweden in 1995 (F AO 1995b), which looked at the management system underlying the use of reference 
points, the decision rules (which are agreed actions when reference points assume values believed to be 
critical or dangerous), and the management procedure and plan that should have been developed around a 
pre-discussed series of objectives for the fishery. Further extensions of this new precautionary frame of 
reference for fisheries management were developed at the F AO-Australia Technical Consultation on Sus­
tainability Indicators in Marine Capture Fisheries, Sydney 18-22 January 1999, where a series of indica­
tors were developed (see e.g. above table) which could form the basis for a more complete monitoring of 
all aspects of the fishery as it responds to economic, social and environmental changes. Seijo and Caddy 
(2000) showed that there are 2 alternative approaches to use of fishery indicators and the values they as­
sume at those reference points which are believed to mark significant changes in the fishery: 
I) Conventional control theory approach, which often incorporates a Bayesian Framework, attempts to 
understand and measure interactions between key variables in the fishery system and the type of uncer­
tainty they are subject to. Since addition of a precautionary framework to the model requires incorporat­
ingjudgements as to the effect, magnitude and importance of changes, in effect this approach usually re­
duces in practice to the second option below. 
2) An empirical approach which regards the fishery as a system of feed-back loops where key variables 
can be defined and measured, but their interactions are unlikely to be precisely defined or even under­
stood. Under this approach a series of measures which are believed to be meaningful, make up a matrix of 
variables whose values can be classified as 'green' for favourable, 'orange' for uncertain and 'red' for un­
favourable. The 'traffic light' approach I suggested for NAFO (Caddy 1 998a) is now used for managing 
shrimp fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic. Shrimp (like tunas) are not easy to age, and cohort analyses 
are uncertain at best. A 'traffic light' approach allows the management response to be adjusted depending 
on the number of 'lights' which turn from green to red on the 'management board.' 
The incidental effects of fishing, ecocertification and CITES 
The Code has several clauses on incidental effects of fishing: 
Article 7.2.2 d : "biodiversity of aquatic habitats and ecosystems is conserved and endangered 
species are protected", 
Article 7.2.2 g: ..."catch of non-target species, both fish and non-fish species, and impacts on 
associated or dependent species are minimized" 
Article 7.5.2 says that the precautionary approach should be used to ensure that uncertainties 
related to (inter alia) "discards, non-target and associated or dependent species are minimized". 
This theme crops up again under Article 8.5 on fishing gear selectivity. 
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On the same theme, , Article IO(d) of the UN Fish Stock Agreement considers that one of the functions 
of a fisheries management organization is to "obtain and evaluate scientific advice, review the status of 
the stocks and assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species". 
It can be seen here that there are two sources of preoccupation: 'conserved or endangered species' where 
CITES criteria are of immediate concern, including marine mammals and turtles, and more recently, 
sharks and sea birds for tuna fisheries. The most recent areas of concern other than excess capacity, relate 
to sea birds (discussed above) and sharks, for both of which a recent FAa meeting discussed a Code of 
Practice and/or Action Plan to reduce these by-catches (FAa 1999). A recent series of case studies issued 
by FAa (Shotton 1999) contains some interesting observations on incidental shark and ray catches in tuna 
fisheries. In the western and central Pacific, some 16 shark species are taken in longline sets, and 10 spe­
cies by purse seine. Although the shark hooking rate for longlines is low, and for purse seines even lower 
(0.15% by weight Williams 1999), sharks are long-lived and low fecundity animals, so perhaps the tuna 
industry needs to keep this issue under review, otherwise accusations of causing impacts on 'associated or 
dependent species' may be made under this heading. 
'Associated species' are presumably other species (also e.g., dolphins for the purse seine fishery) taken 
incidentally to tunas especially if ecologically significant numbers are killed in the process. 'Dependent' 
species refers to situations where the dependent species is a predator: (an example here are capelin fisher­
ies, whose management should leave enough biomass to feed their predator, cod) - this particular cate­
gory does not seem to have much application to tuna fisheries for reasons mentioned elsewhere in this 
paper. 
With respect to compliance with the above articles, the tuna purse seine fishery has had to face criticism 
over the last few decades concerning dolphin by-catch, to which, in my view it has reacted in an ecologi­
cally adequate fashion. The main incidental problems faced now seem to be in the area of bird and turtle 
by-catch by long liners, where attempts are being made to reduce by-catch (e.g. of endangered albatross) 
through specific setting procedures, and the issue of FAD's. 
The FAD issue is a particularly sensitive one, since much of the skipjack cat<;:h in the Eastern Pacific 
where FADs which are vital to the operations of Ecuador, the US and Spain in particular. Other countries 
fish mainly on dolphins for large yellowfin, and see the FAD fishery as exploiting small yello\\fin which 
reduces the total yellowfin catch. Elsewhere, fCCA T has proposed Recommendation 98-1, involving a 
seasonal closure oflarge areas to the use of FAD's the eastern tropical Atlantic, prohibiting sets on float­
ing objects, natural or otherwise. IATTC held an international workshop on this issue in 1992 (e.g. Are­
nas et al. 1999), and the results suggest that by-catches of marine turtles and other species, and high rates 
ofdiscard of incidentally-caught species will occur in FAD fisheries. If correct, the implications of this 
need to be investigated, especially within the context of oceanic food webs. 
The role of tuna commissions and some current drawbacks 
Newton (1999) notes two principal areas of concern relevant to our discussion - namely that tuna com­
missions, while jealously guarding their own area of responsibility over the world's oceans, in fact leave 
the resources oflarge oceanic areas still unprotected, e.g. the tuna stocks of the Western and Central Pa­
cific Ocean. Although tuna fleets move between oceans and management areas, there appears to an out­
sider not to be a great deal of coordination between individual commissions in matters of conservation 
and management of inter-ocean stocks and fleets. 
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FIGURE 2. Changes in the size ofhigh seas fleets (which direct their effort at any species) registered by 
Lloyds, and trends in reflagging (from Smith 1999). 
The other concern mentioned by Newton (1999) is that a significant percentage of tuna fishing vessels are 
flying flags of convenience, which is contrary to the spirit of the UN Fish stock agreement and the Code. 
Both (CCAT and IOTC have made moves towards combating this erosion of the value of their regula­
tions, but evidently there are powerful economic arguments behind the practice. The figure shown above 
from Smith (1999) for the global fleet shows that these numbers have increased recently, and although he 
gives no comparable figure for tuna vessels, this must be a major source of concern. 
Although attaining the objective that any nation fishing for tunas (or other high seas resource) must do so 
under the authority of a regional fisheries body is becoming more effective, so far the use of penalties to 
gain compliance has been confined to ICCA T, with an undetermined level of success at bringing miscre­
ants into the fold. Other tuna bodies should consider the precedent of market-related regulations however, 
and one may even suggest, look to coordinated measures that will make such approaches effective, in­
stead of simply persuading the 'miscreants' to move to an adjacent, more accomodating management 
area. 
Tuna fisheries involve international markets and highly mobile fleets, and in some cases shared stocks. 
Inter-regional cooperation is also required to ensure measures in one area do not cause problems in an­
other. One example was the restriction imposed at the end of 1999 in the eastern Pacific, which caused a 
movement of some purse seiners to the west This 'flight from regulations' in the eastern Pacific in the 
1970s, had flow-on effects to Atlantic fisheries, and also contributed to the development of the US fleet in 
the western Pacific, but such uncoordinated approaches lead to pulse fishing of unprotected areas. 
The need for coordination between commissions 
Some other clauses that may provide difficulties for some tuna commissions are those relating to trans­
parency. Clause 7.1.6 of the Code and Articles 12 (I) and (2) of the Fish Stock Agreement note that rep­
resentatives ofIGO's and NGO's should ideally be given access to reports of meetings of Commissions 
and timely access to records and reports. One may ask how many Tuna Commissions are currently im­
plementing this clause and the associated requirement for 'transparency', or are they relying on the codicil 
to this clause: "subject to the procedural rules on access to them"? 
With respect to MCS, both under the Code and the Fish Stock Agreement this function is exclusively na­
tional: thus Article 7.1.7 enjoins states to establish 'within their respective competencies and capacities' 
effective measures for fisheries monitoring, surveillance, control and enforcement ... and the Fish Stock 
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Agreement dedicates articles 18-23 inel and nine pages oftext to its provisions. The advantages that 
would be conferred by close cooperation regionally in MCS functions, is that it significantly increases 
effectiveness at relatively low cost and would increase the level of compliance regionally. In fact, a Re­
gional Register and regional observer programme has apparently been very effective in the South Pacific 
(Anon 1999). The role of a regional body in this (Article 20, 1) is seen as providing a venue for states to 
discuss provisions for cooperation in enforcement, but nothing more. There are evidently major problems 
when it comes to prosecution of fishers from other member states ofa commission, and this is reflected in 
Article 20(5) "States shall, to the extent permitted by national laws" .... "make evidence available to 
prosecuting authorities in other states". 
One may question whether in the light of problems in regional cooperation, extending cooperation to the 
global level would result in benefits. I would say the answer in principle must be positive; however one 
may doubt the immediate efficiency of any immediate agreements. However, the extent to which states 
which are members of a commission would be ready to cede some state rights for operational authority to 
a strengthened regional organization, and to what extent such body (or the States themselves) would have 
the authority to board vessels outside ofEEZ's, seems to require further discussion. This rapidly becomes 
a key question (see FAO 1998), once VMS systems become uniformly adopted for monitoring offshore 
fisheries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1949, Costa Rica and the United States negotiated a Convention which reflected the need for 
cooperative management of tuna fisheries in the eastern Pacific Ocean. The Convention established a 
Commission to manage tuna fisheries, with a focus on yellowfin and skipjack tunas and other fish taken 
by tuna fishing vessels, in particular baitfish. Over the last 50 years, other countries had joined the 
Commission, and at the time of writing the members were Costa Rica, Ecuador, EI Salvador, France, 
Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Colombia and 
Spain have notified the member governments oftheir intention to join~ a protocol to amend the 
convention that would allow the European Community to join has been agreed by the Commission and is 
awaiting ratification, and Taiwan has indicated its desire to become a Party. 
In this paper, I will outline what I see as some ofthe most important periods or challenges in the history 
ofthe Commission, with the point ofview that remembering how difficult issues were dealt with in the 
past may be of assistance in facing tomorrow's issues. 
1950-2000 
Throughout its history, the issues facing the Commission have also varied greatly. In the Commission's 
first Annual Report the investigation priorities were collection and compilation of fisheries statistics, 
investigation ofthe biology and utilization of bait species, and plans for an oceanographic survey. This 
reflected the Commission's concerns about the effects of the increase in the size of the tuna fisheries in 
the eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO) since the second world war and, in particular, of the collapse of the bait 
fishery in the Gulf of Nicoya, in Costa Rica. From the earliest days, and indeed in the Convention itself, 
it was well understood that management of these fisheries required knowledge of the oceanographic 
systems, as well as the fishery. In recent years universities and other public agencies are doing a large 
amount of oceanographic research and monitoring, with readily-available results, which has reduced the 
need for independent studies by the Commission. 
In the 1950s most of the tuna fishing in the EPO was done by bait boats, which first had to capture bait 
which was held alive to be used to attract and excite a school oftuna, which were then caught with pole­
and-line gear. The success of fishing depended on the availability of both bait and tuna, making this an 
interesting example of a multispecies fishery. 
It is interesting that for the most part the Convention establishing the IATIC was written very generally, 
and applies almost as effectively today as in 1950. The one part that time passed by was the prominence 
given to fish used as bait in the tuna fisheries. In the late 1950s technological developments made purse­
seining, which does not depend on bait, a far more effective fishing method, and by 1961 most ofthe fleet 
had been converted from bait boats to purse seiners. 
Yellowfin quotss 
Prior to 1960 the Commission's investigations had established that none of the tuna or baitfish stocks of 
concern to the Commission had been subjected to fishing intensity above the level that corresponded to 
the average maximum sustainable yield (AMSY). The Commission's Annual Report for 1957 noted that 
it was apparent that the fishery was affecting the yellowfin popUlation, but that there was no likelihood of 
overfishing in the near future. The report concluded that there was no sign of the fishery affecting 
I Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, care of Scripps Institution ofOceanography, 8604 La 10lla Shores 
Drive, La Jolla, California 92037-1508, USA 
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skipjack stocks and that year-to-year fluctuations were largely fishery independent, a conclusion that has 
not yet been changed. 
However, by ]960 the fishing effort had increased sharply, in part because of the conversion to purse 
seining, and the Commission reported that the level of fishing effort had reached the level which would 
provide the AMSY, and in one area may have surpassed it. Accordingly, in ] 96] the Commission noted 
the need for conservation action, and proposed the establishment of a limit of 83,000 short tons (75,296 
metric tons) for 1962. The member Governments were unable to implement a quota for yellowfin until 
1966, and in that year the Commission established the yellowfin regulatory area (CYRA), in which the 
fleet was restricted during part of the year. From then until 1979, and subsequently in 1998, 1999, and 
2000, fishing for yellowfin tuna in the CYRA has been restricted for part of the year. The mechanism of 
the restriction evolved over time, and included mechanisms to allow for fishing for other species in the 
restricted area, with an incidental allowance for yellowfin, allowing vessels to complete fishing trips, and 
special allowances for countries with developing fisheries. The fonner complicated calculations of 
estimates of when a closure should begin because of the amounts ofyellowfin which would be taken. 
The latter later became an important issue during negotiations about access to the fishery at the end of the 
1970s, a subject of a later section. 
In 1966, the fishery was restricted in September after there had been the opportunity to collect data from 
several fishing trips from most vessels. There was adequate time to prepare infonnation with which to 
estimate when the closure should take place, and the economic impact on the fleet was not great. 
However, as the fleet continued to grow, the restrictions were implemented earlier, and in 1972 the 
unrestricted fishery closed on 5 March. Such early closures were difficult to implement because there 
was little opportunity to gather data before the estimated closure date, and they caused major economic 
problems for the fleet. Eventually the restrictions effectively allowed each vessel only two fishing trips in 
the restricted area; this probably encouraged owners to build larger vessels to maximize their catches in a 
restricted time. The economic effects of achieving conservation seemed to be to encourage even more 
fishing effort as participants in the fishery raced to catch as much as possible before the season was 
restricted. 
Offshore expansion of the fishery 
The initial yellowfin restrictions were applied at a time when the fishery was carried out within about 200 
miles of the coast and in the vicinity ofa few offshore islands and banks. Subsequent to 1966 fleets 
moved offshore, by 1969 the area of operation included most of the CYRA, and by 1974 the area 
exploited extended out to between 1400 and 1500 west longitude. In the late I 960s the Commission noted 
that the catch rates in the fishery were greater than those forecast by the staff's population dynamics 
models. 
While there were a variety of other factors, including the shorter season, increased efficiency of vessels, 
and a change in size composition of catch, which may have caused the increased catch rates one of the 
possibilities was that the stock being exploited at the time had a greater productivity than before, and 
accordingly the Commission embarked on a series of investigations to detennine if that was the case. 
This included an increased emphasis in tag-and-release experiments, and genetic and morphological 
studies to endeavor to detennine how much fish in the inshore and offshore areas mixed. None of these 
studies provided conclusive results. 
More directly, the Commission embarked on an experimental overfishing program. The program was 
based on based on previous experience of overfishing in the early t 960s, when the stock had been able to 
recover from previous overfishing, which reduced the catch rate (a surrogate for abundance) to 2.9 short 
tons (2.6 metric tons) per day. The model used by the Commission, based on historical data, predicted 
that catches greater than the estimated AMSY would reduce the catch rate. The catch was allowed to 
exceed the estimated AMSY in a controlled way, and, in fact, the catch rate did not fall by as much as 
predicted. The result ofthe program was an understanding that the productivity of the stock in the 
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expanded area was greater than that of the inshore area, but less than if the offshore areas were 
completely separate from the inshore area. 
Allocation problems in the 1970s 
In the early years of the Commission US vessels made most of the catches of tunas in the EPO. This 
meant that there were initially no difficult issues of allocation of catches or fishing opportunities among 
the countries participating in the fishery. It was relatively easy to facilitate development of tuna fisheries 
in coastal countries by creating small quotas for those countries. However, by 1975 the combined catch 
of countries other than the US reached 42% of the total yellowfin catch (Figure I), and claims for 
allocation to countries became more serious. In that year, Mexico announced its intention to convene a 
meeting to draft a new tuna convention. The interests of the dominant US fleet and those of the countries 
with aspirations to develop their fisheries proved to be too difficult to reconcile, and the negotiations 
failed to reach a conclusion. This failure had serious consequences for cooperation in the eastern Pacific, 
and, in particular, led to the withdrawal of Costa Rica and Mexico from the Commission for several years. 
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FIGURE 1. Catches of yellowfin tuna in the CYRA by surface gear. 
Dolpbins and the International Dolphin Conservation Program 
Purse-seine vessels locate schools of tuna by observing free-swimming schools at the surface of the 
ocean, or by finding schools that are associated with floating objects (either flotsam artificial fish­
aggregating devices (FADs» or with dolphins. The latter association is used for about one hal(of the 
catch ofyellowfin tuna. When yellowfin are located in this way the vessel encircles both the dolphins 
and the tuna and subsequently extricates the dolphins before loading the tuna onboard. Techniques to do 
this have evolved considerably over the last 40 years, so that today almost all dolphins can be removed 
from the net without harm. However, up to 1976 there were hundreds of thousands of dolphins killed 
annually (Figure 2). As the fishery became internationalized, the mortality began increasing again and 
the IATTC agreed that it should be concerned with the issue, and in 1980 initiated its Tuna-Dolphin 
Program, which included collection of data with observers, biological studies, and gear technology. 
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FIGURE 2. Mortalities of dolphins due to purse-seine fishing for tunas in the eastern Pacific Ocean. 
In the early 1990s the US government began using unilateral trade measures to encourage other countries 
to reduce the mortality of dolphins. In 1990 the US canning industry, under threat of boycotts from some 
environmental groups, adopted a policy of buying yellowfin tuna only from fishing trips that did not 
include sets made on dolphins. That, and subsequent legislation, effectively closed the US market to 
imports of tuna caught in the EPO. This encouraged fishing on unassociated schools and floating objects. 
Both of these techniques produced smaller yellowfin, on average, than did fishing on dolphin-associated 
tunas, and both produced relatively large bycatches of bill fishes, sharks, dorado, wahoo, sea turtles, etc. 
In the meantime, international initiatives to address the mortality of dolphins led to the La Jolla 
Agreement of 1992. This object of this agreement, which included almost all the countries with purse­
seine fleets in the EPO, was to reduce dolphin mortality. The La Jolla Agreement provided for 100% 
. observer coverage on all large purse-seine vessels, a system of individual vessel mortality limits, and the 
use of obligatory operational procedures to reduce mortality. Observer data were reviewed by an 
International Review Panel, which included representatives of governments, the fishing industry, and 
environmental groups. The Agreement set a target of less than 5000 dolphins killed per year by 1995, 
and, in fact, by 1993 achieved this target. While the La Jolla Agreement met its objectives with respect to 
reduced dolphin mortality, it did not resolve the problem caused by the closed US markets and the 
incentives to fish without encircling dolphins. Further negotiations led to the 1995 Declaration of 
Panama and the adoption of the 1998 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program 
(AIDCP), which enhanced protection for dolphins and was intended to resolve the marketing issues. 
Embargoes by the United States against members of the AIDCP are in the process of being lifted for 
qualified countries, but labeling constraints remain in place. The nature of the La Jolla Agreement was 
both an independently signed voluntary agreement among governments with an interest in the purse-seine 
fisheries for tunas in the EPO and as binding resolution of the IA TTC. The AIDCP is a legally-binding 
agreement among purse seining countries in which certain objectives are to be met through the lA TTC, 
and to which the lA TTC provides services, including its secretariat. 
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MANAGEMENT CONCERNS IN 2000 
The major fisheries management concerns during 2000 can be seen in the active permanent working 
groups. For fisheries management issues, working groups on bycatch and purse-seine capacity were 
established in 1998, and one on compliance was established in 1999. The role of each, and the underlying 
issues, are described below. During 2000, a scientific working group addressed issues relating to the use 
of FADs and bigeye tuna management. While the latter two working groups addressed only issues 
relating to conservation, underlying both, and in fact most other management decisions, are questions of 
access to, and allocation of, resources. 
Bycatcb 
The purse-seine bycatch working group was established to address bycatches, which might be interacting 
with local fisheries, particularly in Panama and Costa Rica. However, before this particular concern the 
Commission had been concerned about how the levels of by catch and discards of small tunas that were 
occurring when vessels set on tuna schools associated with floating objects. For many fishermen the use 
of floating objects as a tuna-aggregating feature had seemed a useful alternative to setting on schools of 
yellowfin associated with dolphins. However, while this avoided problems with encirclement of 
dolphins, it soon became clear that this fishing method produced relatively large bycatches of unwanted 
species compared to other methods of purse seining for tunas, and tended to catch small yellowfin and 
bigeye. The concerns of the Commission were reinforced by sections of the Code of Conduct and the 
Fish Stocks Agreement which reflect a global understanding that fisheries management ought to be 
concerned with the impacts of fishing across the ecosystem, rather than just the species being targeted. 
Capacity 
The profitability oftuna purse seining in the late 1970s was such that the fleet in the EPO grew rapidly 
(Figure 3). (At that time prices paid to fishermen for yellowfin and skipjack were greater than they are 
now.) The first problem with the large fleet was the need for restrictions on fishing earlier and earlier in 
the year to try to conserve the stock (Figure 4). The allocation issues discussed above led to difficulties in 
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FIGURE 3. Total fish-carrying capacities of tuna purse seiners (heavy line) and total catches of 
yellowfin by surface gear (light line) in the eastern Pacific Ocean. 
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FIGURE 4. Restricted periods (heavy shading) for fishing for yellowfin tuna in the Commission's 
Yellowfin Regulatory Area. 
obtaining agreement and ultimately to no agreement on the closure of the CYRA. The fleet growth, 
coupled with a concentration of fishing on floating objects and unassociated schools, caused a large 
decline in the stock ofyellowfin tuna that had very severe consequences on the industry. The reduced 
stock and other factors, including a strong EI Nino, restrictions associated with dolphins. and the 
attractiveness of the western Pacific fishing grounds, caused an exodus of the US fleet, which at that time 
was the largest component of the eastern Pacific fleet. 
By ] 983 the yellowfin stock had recovered, and, in fact, had grown to a greater size than immediately 
before the decline. However, the fishing fleet remained at relatively low levels until the 1990s when the 
purse-seine fleet again approached the size it had been in the late 1970s. Once again, there have been 
restrictions on yellowfin catches and the Commission is endeavoring to initially limit further growth of 
the purse-seine fleet and then to reduce its size. 
Compliance and enforcement 
During the period between ] 966 and 1977, when yellowfin restrictions were in force, the restrictions 
applied effectively only to vessels ofthe United States. That made it practical and acceptable for the 
monitoring and enforcement of the restrictions to be carried out entirely by that country. 
Today there are fleets from many countries involved in the fishery, and the Commission members have 
taken a collective interest in monitoring compliance with the conservation resolutions of 1998 and 1999. 
This has been expressed in the establishment of a compliance working group and of use of data collected 
by the stafi'to provide evidence of compliance or non-compliance with management measures. The 
compliance working group is to exchange information on measures countries have taken to implement 
Commission resolutions and to examine data relating to compliance. 
Access and allocation 
While the issues of bycatch and capacity are driven primarily by conservation objectives, they interact 
with questions of access to the fishery and allocation of fishing opportunities. 
The 1988 resolution aimed at controlling the growth in fleet capacity acknowledged an agreement by the 
fishing countries to restrain their fleets within national caps, and noted the rights of other coastal states to 
develop fleets. Effectively, it established at least a partial allocation of fishing opportunities. It was been 
recognized that any allocation had to have sufficient flexibility to allow coastal countries to exercise their 
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rights. The Commission's working group has also noted that there is a need for any restraint of this sort 
to take account of other components of the tuna fishing fleet, and specifically the longline fleet. 
Measures to control bycatch and the discards of small tunas have two general thrusts. The first is whether 
those undesirable catches can be reduced by employing appropriate technology, but failing that, by 
restricting the amount of fishing on floating objects. Because the fleets of some countries specialize in 
fishing on floating objects, restricting the amount on fishing on those amounts to restricting access to 
parts of the international fleet to the fishery. Further, because fishing on floating objects is currently the 
primary method of catching skipjack (Table I) these restrictions amount to restrictions on the total 
skipjack catch. 
TABLE 1. Catches (metric tons) of yellowfin, bigeye, and skipjack tuna by three purse-seine modes of fishing in 
1999. 
Yellowfin Bigeye Skipjack 
Dolphin sets 147,715 o 1,295 
Unassociated sets 112,791 4,388 87,624 
Floating-object sets 37,823 31,469 180,416 
The interaction of catches of small yellowfin or bigeye tunas taken by setting on floating objects and the 
catches of either large yellowfin tuna in association with dolphins or large bigeye tuna taken on longlines 
brings allocation issues directly to the fore. In the absence of technology to catch skipjack without 
associated catches of small yellowfin and bigeye, catching skipjack in association with floating objects 
will reduce the catches available for the other two methods. Consequently, the Commission has had to 
consider whether catches of skipjack on floating objects ought to be restricted to allow greater catches of 
yellowfin or bigeye in the other fisheries. Similarly, setting on unassociated schools also produces small 
yellowfin and reduces the catches available to purse seiners fishing on dolphins. In general, different 
countries are engaged in each of the fisheries, and hence this becomes an issue of allocation among 
countries. 
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (CONVENTION, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND MEMBERSHIP) 
The 1949 Convention predates most modern ideas of international fisheries management. The 
Convention is an empowering rather than a prescriptive instrument, so it has been possible for the 
Commission to change with the times. Nevertheless, the members have recognized that there would be 
advantages in bringing the convention up to date. In 1995, IATTC members and other interested 
countries committed themselves to the Declaration on Strengthening the Objectives and Operation of the 
Convention Establishing the IATIC. This was followed up in 1998 with the establishment of a working 
group to review the functions of the fATTC and its Convention. The working group has met four times, 
and is considering a negotiating text. 
While the revised convention is expected to address issues of membership and financial contributions, 
these issues were seen to be sufficiently urgent to warrant them being treated independently, with the 
expectation of achieving results which could be implemented more quickly than a new convention. 
Membership has been addressed, at least partially, with the 1998 Resolution on the Participation of 
Taiwan in the Work of the IATIC and the 1999 Protocol to Amend the 1949 Convention on the 
Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission to permit the adherence of the European 
Union. The 1949 Convention gives general directions for financial contributions to the Commission. The 
contributions have been based on a formula that used utilization in each country as its basis. While this 
worked well for much of the life of the Commission, the formula is clearly in need of revision now. The 
1999 resolution on financing the IATTC established a working group, which is developing a new formula 
consistent with the 1949 Convention and has recommended contributions for the current (f October 1999­
30 September 2000) and next fiscal year based on its work. 
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FUTURE ISSUES 
Foremost in the work of this Commission is the imperative to provide a scientific basis for the 
management of tuna fisheries. This involves continual improvement in data collection and in techniques 
of stock assessment. Changes in fishing technology and in the participants in the fishery provide ongoing 
opportunities and challenges in both areas. Knowledge of various aspects of the biology of tunas is also 
improving. 
Apart from that need, the most obvious management issues for the future are, of course, those being 
addressed today whose resolution is not obvious. In my view, foremost among those are how to manage 
access to the fishery to ensure that both conservation objectives and social and economic objectives are 
met, and how to provide all participants with an assurance that the measures adopted by the Commission 
are complied with. 
The current Convention does not mandate management to achieve social and economic goals and, at least 
to date, these have not been included in the discussions for a revised Convention. However, even without 
those types of objectives being explicitly stated, they will have to be addressed ifthe Commission is to 
deal successfully with conservation. 
With the exception of the 1998 Resolution on Fleet Capacity, the Commission has directed its fisheries 
management resolutions to measures that control catches directly. The basis for this has been that 
limiting catches is sufficient to ensure that the fishery is sustainable, at least on a biological basis. The 
same result could have been achieved by limiting fishing effort. In the past, there have been periods when 
there was considerable excess capacity and it was necessary to restrict the yellowfin fishery in the CYRA. 
As noted above, these restrictions reduced the period of unrestricted fishing to as little as three months of 
the year. Initially these restrictions affected mostly the dominant US fleet, and the resulting issues of 
compliance and deteriorating economic performance could be addressed unilaterally. However, by the 
iate 1970s the fishery was becoming more international, and questions of access to the fishery at a time 
when there was excess fleet capacity were increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible to resolve. 
In 1999, there were various restrictions applied to purse seining in October and November, and 
discussions about their implementation foreshadowed the sorts of difficulties that might be expected in 
future. There are two reasons for expecting that conservation goals will require increasingly strict 
application of measures to reduce catches. The first is that as long as a fishery is profitable additional 
effort will be attracted. Certainly the purse-seine fleet has grown over the past ten years, and apparently 
is continuing to do so. The second is that the fishery has apparently been enjoying a relatively high level 
of abundance of yeHowfin tuna over the past twenty years. The analyses of the stock condition have 
pointed out that recruitment over the 1981-1998 period was high, compared to that for the previous 
twenty years. While it is hard to completely separate this from other factors, it seems likely that the 
recruitment in the 1980s and 1990s was associated with favorable oceanic conditions. Oceanographers 
have identified a decadal-scale change in the EPO, which has been associated with warmer-than-normal 
temperatures during that period, which may now be ending. If that is so, we might expect future 
sustained yields of yellowfin in the EPO to be reduced. The current high catches of bigeye and skipjack 
might also depend on transitory environmental conditions. It would be extraordinarily rash to rely on the 
experience ofjust the past two or three years as a guide to the level of future sustainable catches. Thus, 
unless action is taken, we should be prepared for a future with a larger fleet, a smaller resource, more 
difficulty in achieving agreement on conservation measures, and reduced profitability. While the 1949 
Convention is not concerned with economic issues, their impact on conservation decisions will be so 
great that they cannot be ignored, and management schemes which try to do so will inevitably fail. 
It seems to me that it is inevitable that successful management of this fishery, and indeed most others as 
well, requires some arrangement to restrict access to it. If a cap is placed on the fleet size, the obvious 
way to administer it is to use limits for each Party, as in the 1998 Capacity resolution. 
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Doing so will require an agreement on an initial level of capacity for each Party, probably a mechanism to 
reduce capacities towards a target level, and a mechanism to adjust Party's capacities to match changing 
situations. While negotiations are well on the way to achieving the first step, I believe that negotiations 
among Parties will prove to be too cumbersome a mechanism to use to make the adjustments that will be 
required over time. The changes will need to reflect changing levels of interest among industries of each 
Party, accommodating the interests of new entrants and wishes to change flags of vessels. 
New entrants could be accommodated in the fishery, or the share ofan existing Party could be increased, 
only if some existing allocations are reduced. It is hard to see how that could be negotiated without 
industry involvement in arrangements that benefit all Parties. In future, it would be best if changes in 
allocations were arranged via commercial transactions among the participants. Governments could 
remove themselves from questions of allocation, and focus on the conservation and best use ofthe fish 
stocks. 
There is every likelihood that the type of measures seen during 1999 and 2000 will continue to be 
required for the well being of the fishery in future. For these measures to be effective, they must be 
complied with. One of the factors in achieving that will be collecting and sharing information on 
compliance among the Parties. 
The changes ofthe last few years and those to come have required substantial changes in the staff of the 
Commission. The Commission was originally established with a staff concerned only with scientific data 
collection and analysis. This role widened in 1980 to include gear technology. The 1992 La Jolla 
Agreement brought with it a role in providing information on compliance, with both observers and 
permanent staff preparing information for the International Review Panel. This has been further extended 
with the work of the Compl iance Working Group. The staff currently performs all the analyses of data 
required to provide information on compliance with IA TIC measures and fisheries management. 
Another change for the staff has come with analyses to support the Capacity Working Group and the 
requirement to draft a plan of action for capacity. In addition to having a capacity for scientific analysis, 
the staff is expected monitor the fishery to provide compliance information, and to provide legal and 
fisheries management advice. 
CONCLUSION 
The first 50 years of the IATIC have been full of changes. The fishing methods, participants, 
conservation issues, and international law relating to fisheries have all shown remarkable change. That 
almost all ofthe 1949 Convention is relevant today is a tribute to those who wrote it. The value of 
empowering a Commission, rather than prescribing its role, should not be lost on those writing new 
conventions. 
There are many lessons in the history of the fishery and the Commission that we need to remember as we 
embark on the next 50 years. One of the most important is that there is always more to learn about the 
way fish stocks and their environment change. As soon as we think we understand what is happening, we 
should be prepared for the unexpected. To cope with this, management systems have to be flexible and 
adaptable. 
The second important point is that management of this fishery (and any other) is about the actions of 
people and their effect on fish stocks. While conservation is properly the paramount goal of the 
Commission, it cannot be achieved without the support of governments and fishing industries, and this 
will not be achieved unless the measures to achieve conservation are seen to be fair and to provide 
reasonable returns to those who participate. As we have seen from the past, the overall quotas which we 
still use today will fail when fishing pressure becomes too great. It is clear that the greatest problem 
facing the management of this fishery is the need to find a way of allocating access to the fishery in a way 
that will fairly address the rights and obligations of all countries and their industries that wish to 
participate at a level consistent with good conservation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I am grateful to the Director of IATIC to have been given this opportunity to participate in this very im­
portant and timely symposium on the status ofworld tuna fisheries. Those of us who have been closely 
involved in international fisheries over the past few years live in interesting times. Since the early 1990s, 
we have seen a definite shift in emphasis in the norms that govern the exploitation of fisheries resources. 
Better conservation of resources has become the paramount consideration. 
Only two weeks ago, the first meeting of the United Nations Informal Consultative Process on Oceans 
stressed the need for all States to give full effect to the legal framework for conservation and management 
as contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea of 10 Decem­
ber 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks. 
Regional organizations playa critical role in managing international fisheries. It is important, however, 
that such organizations are effective. Where necessary, existing regional fishery management organiza­
tions should be reviewed to ensure that their mandate and procedures are fully consistent with the legal 
framework established by the Convention and the Agreement. In this regard, IATTC has taken the lead 
and set an important precedent in reviewing its existing convention so as to better equip itself to meet the 
challenge of better conservation and management. Organizations such as the North-East Atlantic Fisher­
ies Commission, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) have also taken action to update their 
procedures. At the same time, new organizations are being established in areas which were not previ­
ously regulated, such as the Western and Central Pacific and the South-East Atlantic. 
The purpose of my paper is to review some of the most interesting provisions contained in the draft Con­
vention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Cen­
tral Pacific Ocean.3 
The draft Convention is a direct response to the 1995 Agreement. That Agreement, as its long title sug­
gests, consolidates and elaborates upon certain provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migra­
tory fish stocks. In particular, the Agreement elaborates upon articles 63, 64 and 1 16 to 120 of the 1982 
Convention by, amongst other things, prescribing the mechanisms for international cooperation between 
coastal States and high seas fishing nations in order to achieve long-term sustainability of high seas fish­
eries resources. The two instruments together create a seamless regime between the high seas and areas 
under national jurisdiction. 
One of the key mechanisms for international cooperation envisaged by the Agreement is the establish­
ment of subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements. lndeed, most of the 
substantive provisions of the Agreement are intended to be implemented by and through regional fisheries 
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organizations and several articles of the Agreement are devoted to an explicit description of the nature 
and functions of such organizations.4 
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE: THE MAJURO DECLARATION 
Following the entry into force, on 16 November 1994, of the 1982 Convention, the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency, in December 1994, convened a multilateral high-level conference on South Pacific tuna 
fisheries.s The broad objective of the conference was to promote the full implementation of responsible 
fishing operations by fishing vessels operating in the South Pacific region, particularly in the light of the 
then ongoing United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks as 
well as the series of consultations convened by F AO to develop a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fish­
eries. 
A second multilateral conference was convened at Majuro, Marshall Islands, in June 1997, fOllowing the 
adoption of the UN Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in order to consider issues 
relating to the establishment of a regional mechanism for the conservation and management of highly mi­
gratory fish stocks. The most important outcome ofthe conference was the Majuro Declaration in which 
participants in the conference declared, amongst other things, their commitment to establish a mechanism 
for the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean in accordance with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement within an overall time-frame of three 
years from June 1997. 
The significance of the Majuro Declaration cannot be over-estimated. The Central Western Pacific sup­
ports one of the most commercially imponant tuna fisheries in the world. While the greatest part of this 
fishery takes place in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of a number of small island developing States 
and in the adjacent high seas areas, the tuna stocks are, for the most part, harvested by the fleets of distant 
water fishing nations. This might seem a clear case for international cooperation for conservation and 
management of the stocks, yet, since the establishment of 200 nautical mile EEZs and fisheries zones in 
the early 1 980s, the island States of the region have staunchly resisted calls for the establ ishment of an 
international tuna management organization as envisaged by article 64 ofthe 1982 Convention.6 Indeed, 
several attempts to establish a multilateral dialogue on the issue in the 1980s, such as an attempt to estab­
lish a multilateral management regime for the South Pacific albacore stock, failed in the face ofdistrust 
between the coastal States of the region and the distant water fishing nations.7 
Structure and process 
Following the adoption ofthe Majuro Declaration, four further sessions ofthe Multilateral High-Level 
Conference (MHLC) were convened.8 The sixth session took place at Honolulu in April 2000. The final 
session ofthe Conference is scheduled to take place in Fiji Islands in late August 2000. It is anticipated 
that the Convention would be opened for signature at that time. 
Participation in the first session of the Conference was by invitation ofthe South Pacific Forum Fisheries 
Agency, as convener of the Conference. Subsequently, other States and entities with an interest in the 
highly migratory fish stocks in the region have been invited to participate in the Conference, either as full 
participants, or as observers. Currently, 29 States and entities are participants in the Conference.9 A fur­
ther three States and entities participate as observers.lo 
At the Majuro session, in 1997, the Conference decided to appoint as its permanent chairman Ambassador 
Satya N. Nandan of Fiji Islands. Ambassador Nandan was also, of course, the chairman of the United 
Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
The method of working adopted by the MHLC has been very similar to that of the UN Conference. In 
1998, Ambassador Nandan issued a working paper consisting ofa set of articles for a draft Convention. 
At the end ofthe session, the Chairman revised the working paper in the light ofthe discussions and this 
revised paper formed the basis for discussions at the fourth session ofthe Conference in February 1999. 
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At the fifth session, in September 1999, a preamble and final clauses were added to the working paper and 
further revisions issued. At the sixth session, in April 2000, the working paper evolved into a draft Con­
vention. As was the case in the UN Conference, most of the work of MHLC has been conducted in in~ 
formal session, open to all participants. I I 
THE DRAFT CONVENTION 
In its current form,12 the draft Convention consists of 45 articles, contained in 12 parts, and three annexes. 
The document takes as its starting point the provisions of the UN Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks Agreement and this is readily apparent from the structure of the document, which follows very 
closely the structure of the Agreement. In some areas, however, such as compliance and enforcement, the 
document contains a far greater level ofdetail than the Agreement and in this respect, existing regional 
arrangements were taken into account, such as the provisions of the multilateral treaty on fisheries be­
tween the United States and the members of the Forum Fisheries Agency.IJ The document also draws 
upon the work done by F AO, including the F AO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fish­
ing Vessels on the High Seas. In addition, a number of other international fisheries agreements were used 
as precedents, including those establishing NAFO, IATTC, the International Commission for the Conser­
vation of Atlantic Tunas and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, as well as 
the Bering Sea Agreement and the proposal currently under consideration for the South-East Atlantic. 
The objective ofthe draft Convention, as set out in article 2, is to ensure, through effective management, 
the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the Central Western Pa­
cific in accordance with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement. 
The convention area 
In addition to the area commonly referred to as the Central Western Pacific, the provisions of the Conven­
tion also apply to a substantial portion of the Pacific Ocean. The size of the area to be covered by the 
Convention was one ofthe most difficult issues to resolve, subject to a range of competing political, geo­
graphic, scientific and biological considerations. 
By the end of the fifth session, agreement had been reached on the southern and eastern boundaries of the 
proposed Convention Area, but it appeared to be impossible to reach a consensus on the northern and 
western boundaries. Despite lengthy negotiations and numerous constructive suggestions, it proved im­
possible to find an acceptable western boundary that does not impinge upon sensitive political areas such 
as the South China Sea and the archipelagos waters ofIndonesia and the Philippines. To the north, a 
boundary of23°30' North was originally proposed. Several delegations considered that such a boundary 
would exclude a substantial portion of the stocksl4 and an alternative boundary at 50° North was sug­
gested. While this would include all the relevant stocks, it would also cause political difficulties for some 
delegations, particularly Japan and China, and was therefore unacceptable. Accordingly, the current 
Convention text defines the western and northern boundaries of the Convention Area by reference to the 
migratory range of the stocks, leaving it for the proposed Commission to define the area of applicability 
of specific conservation and management measures. It is understood, however, by all participants that the 
Convention Area is not intended to include waters in South-East Asia which are not part of the Pacific 
Ocean; nor is it intended to include the waters of the South China Sea as this would involve States which 
are not participants in the Conference. 
In the south, the proposed Convention Area abuts the CCAMLR area at 60° South. In the east, south of 
the equator, the line is drawn at 130° West, so as to include French Polynesia and part of the Pitcairn Is­
lands' EEZ, and north of the equator, at ) 50° West. It will be noted that this creates an overlap south of 
the equator with the area covered by the IATIC, although IATTC does not currently regulate the area in 
question. In order to deal with this situation, a specific provision is included in the draft Convention re­
quiring cooperation with IATIC in the area of overlap.ls An additional proposal was made by one dele­
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gation during the sixth session to extend the eastern boundary in the north to the mainland of the United 
States, in order to allow the Commission the possibility of regulating the albacore fishery in that area. It 
was felt by some delegations, however, that the proposal would lead to unnecessary duplication of effort 
by the proposed Commission and IATTC and that conservation and management in that area would best 
be achieved by cooperation between the two organizations. 
Conservation and management 
Part 11 of the draft Convention, consisting of four articles, sets out the principles for conservation and 
management of highly migratory fish stocks. These are based substantially on the corresponding articles 
in the 1995 UN Agreement. The application of the precautionary approach, in accordance with the guide­
lines contained in Annex II of the 1995 UN Agreement, is enshrined in the draft Convention together with 
the principles and measures for conservation and management set out in articles 5 and 6 of the Agree­
ment. Most importantly, however, article 7 of the draft Convention provides that the principles and 
measures enumerated in article 5 shall be applied by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction 
in the Convention Area in the exercise oftheir sovereign rights for the purpose ofexploring and exploit­
ing, conserving and managing highly migratory fish stocks. It is clear, therefore, that in this respect the 
draft Convention applies both to the high seas and to areas under national jurisdiction. The objective is to 
ensure that there is, as far as possible, a seamless regime for conservation and management throughout the 
region. 
Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the West­
ern and Central Pacific Ocean 
To implement the objectives of the Convention, a new institution is created, called the Commission for 
the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean. The draft sets out in detail the powers and functions ofthe Commission, based largely upon the 
provisions of articles 10 and 11 of the 1995 Agreement. The Commission would have two subsidiary 
bodies; a Scientific Committee and a Compliance Committee, which would provide scientific and techni­
cal advice respectively. The draft describes the nature of the conservation and management measures that 
may be taken and, consistent with the 1995 UN Agreement, sets out the principles on which such meas­
ures must be based. 
One of the interesting features of the draft Convention is a provision which allows the Commission to 
appoint "scientific experts" to conduct scientific analyses and provide independent information and ad­
vice. The findings and recommendations of the scientific experts would be reviewed by the Scientific 
Committee prior to their consideration by the Commission. 
Decision-making 
The provisions on decision-making within the proposed Commission are without doubt the most contro­
versial and innovative provisions ofthe draft Convention. 
Article 10, paragraphs (j) and (k), ofthe UN Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement 
states that members of regional fisheries management organizations shall "agree on decision-making pro­
cedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation and management measures in a timely and efficient 
manner" and "promote the peaceful settlement of disputes ...". Article 28 ofthe Agreement provides fur­
ther that "States shall agree on efficient and expeditious decision-making procedures within subregional 
and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements and shall strengthen existing decision­
making procedures as necessary." In adopting these provisions, the UN Conference was mindful ofthe 
fact that traditional decision-making procedures such as objection or consensus procedures, without ade­
quate dispute settlement procedures, have rendered a number of fisheries organization ineffective or have 
left member States no other course but to take unilateral enforcement action. 
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The procedure that has been developed in article 20 of the draft Convention reflects the generally ac­
cepted view at MHLC that there must be recourse to a prompt and effective procedure for decision­
making, which would avoid the possibility of deadlock on important and urgent conservation and man­
agement issues. The general rule, as stated in article 20, is that decision-making shall be by consensus. 
The Convention identifies a number of key issues upon which consensus is required. These include the 
adoption of rules of procedure, decisions on allocation of total allowable catch or levels of fishing effort, 
adoption of financial regulations, adoption of the budget and the formula for assessment of contributions 
to the budget, admission of new members and adoption of amendments to the Convention. If all efforts to 
reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted, decisions by voting on matters of substance, other 
than those for which consensus is required shall be by a four-fifths majority. 
The objective ofthe scheme that has been proposed is to remove the traditional "opt-out" provision which 
is found in many existing fisheries agreements and which effectively permits States unilaterally to under­
mine the conservation and management measures agreed on by the majority. In supporting this approach, 
many participants in the Conference have stressed the need to give priority to conservation and sustain­
able utilization objectives over strictly economic objectives. The proposed formula for decision-making 
has not yet achieved universal support. Certain distant-water fishing nations continue to be concerned 
that they will be forced to endure a "tyranny of the majority" in which they will always find themselves 
outvoted on matters of substance. Clearly, however, a four-fifths majority is a very high threshold which 
can only be achieved ifthere is broad agreement. For example, ifthere were 25 members ofthe Commis­
sion, at least 21 members would have to vote in favor of a substantive proposal. Given the diversity of 
interests in the Conference, it appears exceedingly unlikely that such a high majority would consistently 
act against the interests of a minority of States. 
To further safeguard minority interests, however, the Convention contains a number of other interesting 
provisions. Thus, in the event of deadlock within the Commission on an issue requiring consensus, there 
is a procedure for conciliation in order to achieve consensus within a reasonable time. Further, in the 
event that a member of the Commission objects to a decision, the draft provides a system for independent 
review of that decision, with the possibility for the Commission to modifY, amend or revoke its decision 
in the light of the findings and recommendations ofthe review panel. 
Dispute settlement 
Article 30 of the UN Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement adopts the dispute settle­
ment mechanism set out in Part XV of the 1982 Convention and applies it to disputes concerning the in­
terpretation or application ofthe Agreement. Paragraph 2 ofthat article also applies the mechanisms in 
Part XV mutatis mutandis to disputes between contracting parties concerning the interpretation or appli­
cation of a subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement relating to the conservation and manage­
ment of straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, "including any dispute concerning the con­
servation and management of such stocks". 
The draft Convention takes this approach one step further by providing, in article 31, that "the provisions 
relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part VIII of the Agreement apply mutatis mutandis to any 
dispute between members of the Commission concerning the interpretation and application of this Con­
vention, whether or not they are also parties to the Agreement." [Emphasis added]. 
It has been pointed out that the effect of article 30 (2) of the 1995 UN Agreement is to add to the dispute 
settlement provisions of the 1982 Convention by expanding the categories of disputes subject to compul­
sory jurisdiction. It would, for example, make compulsory and binding dispute settlement available to 
challenge the actions of contracting parties who opt out of a conservation and management decision and 
institute a unilateral fishing plan which threatens conservation. 16 In the context of the Central Western 
Pacific, however, the additional question that must be considered is whether compulsory binding settle­
ment is available in respect of decisions affecting the high seas only, or whether, in the interests of sus­
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tainable management, coastal States may also be held accountable in some circumstances for compliance 
with their obligations in respect of highly migratory fish stocks within the EEZ. 
The traditional view is that, under article 297 (3) of the 1982 Convention, disputes concerning the exer­
cise of sovereign rights within the economic zone are excluded from compulsory binding settlement pro­
cedures. It is arguable, however, that the effect ofthe 1995 UN Agreement, which places clear obliga­
tions on coastal States with regard to the management of EEZ stocks, is to make coastal States account­
able for ineffective management of such stocks, where this results from a failure to observe the basic 
principles for conservation and management set out in the Agreement. This would require a narrower 
interpretation of article 297 (3) of the 1982 Convention, to cover only the exercise of coastal State discre­
tion on matters which are purely of EEZ concern. 17 
If anything, the draft Convention is even more explicit than the UN Agreement in placing obligations on 
coastal States to better manage their EEZs and to cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatibility. 
Article 7 ofthe draft Convention, for example, establishes an unqualified obligation on coastal States to 
apply the principles and measures for conservation and management within areas under national jurisdic­
tion. It will be interesting to observe in the future how coastal States respond to decisions ofthe Com­
mission which might require them to constrain fishing effort within the EEZ and how assiduously fishing 
nations seek to ensure that coastal States fulfill their obligations under the Convention. 
Compliance and enforcement 
Like the 1995 UN Agreement, the draft Convention contains very strong provisions on compliance and 
enforcement. There is no doubt that this aspect of the Agreement was the most difficult issue ofall for 
many of the fishing nations participating in the UN Conference. Ifanything, the practical implementation 
ofthe provisions of the Agreement has given rise to even greater difficulty for the fishing nations in the· 
context ofthe draft Convention. 
In article 24, captioned "Flag State duties", the draft Convention reproduces, almost verbatim, the central 
provisions of the F AO Compliance Agreement. 18 The Convention provides that no member of the Com­
mission shall allow any fishing vessel entitled to fly its flag to be used for fishing for highly migratory 
fish stocks in the Convention Area beyond its limit of national jurisdiction unless it has been authorized to 
do so by the flag State authorities. The Convention further provides that such authorizations shall be is­
sued only where the flag State is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in respect of the vessel 
under the 1982 Convention. In addition, it is a condition ofany authorization issued by the flag State that 
certain basic minimum terms and conditions for fishing in the Convention Area are observed. These 
minimum terms and conditions are set out in Annex II of the draft Convention. One of the functions of 
the Commission would be to maintain a record of all fishing vessels authorized to fish in the Convention 
Area by members of the Commission and to make that information available to all members. 
On this issue, while some fishing nations have taken issue with the level of detail in the draft Convention, 
the basic objectives of promoting transparency and better flag State control (a basic requirement of article 
94 of the 1982 Convention) are generally accepted as important. 19 
Article 25 establishes the procedures for compliance and enforcement. It is based in large part upon the 
far-reaching enforcement provisions contained in article 4 of the multilateral fisheries treaty between the 
United States and the members of the Forum Fisheries Agency. 
Perhaps the most radical innovation in the UN Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement is 
the way in which it confers on members of regional fisheries organizations the right to enforce those 
measures on the high seas against vessels of States Parties to the Agreement whether or not such States 
are also members of the relevant regional fisheries organization. Pursuant to article 21 of the Agreement, 
regional fisheries organizations are required to establish procedures for boarding and inspection. How­
ever, if within two years ofthe adoption ofthe Agreement (i.e. by 4 August 1997) any regional organiza­
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tion has not adopted such procedures, boarding and inspection shall be carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of articles 21 and 22. 
The draft Convention seeks to give practical application to these provisions by making articles 21 and 22 
of the UN Agreement directly applicable to the Commission, but at the same time delaying the applica­
tion of the provisions to allow the Commission time to develop its own procedures for boarding and in­
spection. Article 26 of the draft Convention text provides that if, within two years of the entry into force 
ofthe Convention, the Commission is not able to agree on procedures for boarding and inspection, or on 
an alternative mechanism which effectively discharges the obligations of the members of the Commission 
under the 1995 Agreement and the Convention to ensure compliance with the conservation and manage­
ment measures established by the Commission, articles 21 and 22 of the Agreement shall apply as if they 
were part ofthe Convention and boarding and inspection of fishing vessels in the Convention Area shall 
be conducted in accordance with the procedures set out therein and such additional practical procedures 
as the Commission may decide are necessary for the implementation of articles 21 and 22. The latter 
qualification was added at a late stage during the sixth session of the Conference in the light of concerns 
raised by some delegations and in order to clarify the nature and application of the procedures that the 
Commission will need to adopt in due course. 
The proposed formula represents a substantial derogation from the strict application of the 1995 UN 
Agreement. It has come about primarily as a result of the deep sense of unease among fishing nations 
with respect to articles 21 and 22 ofthe Agreement, particularly their application to fisheries for highly 
migratory species. On a strict interpretation ofthe Agreement, articles 21 and 22 would normally apply 
immediately upon entry into force of the new Convention, at least as between those members of the 
Commission which are also States Parties to the 1995 UN Agreement (and assuming the UN Agreement 
is in force by that time). In fact, under the current proposal, the application of the provisions of the UN 
Agreement would be deferred for a further period of two years from the date of entry into force of the 
new Convention, at least for members of the Commission. On the other hand, if the UN Agreement en­
ters into force before the new Convention enters into force, then the provisions of articles 21 and 22 could 
be used in the Convention A('ea by States Parties to the UN Agreement, whether or not they are also 
members of the Commission, to board and inspect the vessels of other States Parties to the UN Agree­
ment who are not members of the Commission. 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
MHLC has made substantial and rapid progress since 1997 and most of the key issues have been negoti­
ated and resolved. During the sixth session in April 2000, it would appear that there was a satisfactory 
resolution of most of the critical issues surrounding boarding and inspection and compliance and en­
forcement. There remain, however, a number ofdifficult issues to be resolved before the draft Conven­
tion can be adopted. These include the issue of decision-making, where some participants still wish to see 
a traditional opt-out clause. 
Perhaps the most difficult issue of all that the Conference must address is one that is unrelated to fishing. 
This concerns the participation of Taiwan in the regional arrangement. Taiwan is, ofcourse, a major fish­
ing entity and is implicitly recognized as such in the UN Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
Agreement (article 1 (3) and article 17 (3). One of the important achievements of the Conference to date 
has been the participation ofboth China and Taiwan in the negotiations. In the words of the Chairman of 
the Conference 
"Participation in this Conference is based on the fact that the participants are either coastal 
States or territories in the region or have fishing interests in the region. Ifwe are going to 
have an effective regime for fisheries conservation and management in the region then it is 
obvious that all those who belong to the region or fish in the region must be involved.,,20 
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As presently drafted, the Convention would allow a "fishing entity, being a separate customs territory 
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations, and whose vessels fish for 
highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area" to become a full member of the Commission, with 
the same rights and obligations as a Contracting Party, after affirming in writing its acceptance of the 
Convention regime. Such affirmation may be made only after entry into force of the Convention. 
Discussions on this issue during the sixth session did not result in a formula that was acceptable to both 
China and Taiwan and the situation was made more complex as a result of the elections that had taken 
place in Taiwan shortly before the session. As the Chairman noted in his closing statement to the sixth 
session, "The difficulty is how to find a formula which creates a legally binding relationship without pre­
judging the legal and political status of such entities." 
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND THE INTERIM REGIME 
During the sixth session, the Conference was able to address the critical issue of entry into force. The 
particular concern was that the entry into force of the Convention should not be stalled for an inordinate 
length of time. Initially, a simplified provision was proposed whereby the Convention could be brought 
into force by a small number of States within two years. This proposal was not acceptable to some par­
ticipants, however, and it was also considered undesirable to allow the Convention to enter into force with 
only a few participants. The current formula provides that the Convention will enter into force upon rati­
fication by three States situated north of 20° North and seven States situated south of 20° North. 
Closely linked to the question of entry into force was the matter ofthe interim regime, which would be 
designed to avoid the situation whereby the conservation and management objectives of the draft Conven­
tion could be compromised during the period before entry into force. To this end, the sixth session of the 
Conference considered a draft resolution establishing a Preparatory Conference21 , which would begin its' 
work within a reasonable time after the adoption of the Convention and which would be empowered to 
consider and make recommendations relating to most of the practical and administrative arrangements for 
the future Commission. The participants in the Preparatory Conference would be the participants in the 
Conference. In this way the Commission would have before it the necessary recommendations to con­
sider and adopt so that it would be able to begin its work without delay. 
CONCLUSION 
The Central Western Pacific is one of the few remaining areas where no international organization exists 
for the management of highly migratory fish stocks. As a result of the UN Straddling and Highly Migra­
tory Fish Stocks Agreement, the establishment of such an organization in the region has become impera­
tive.22 Despite a long history offailed attempts to establish a multilateral dialogue, coastal States in the 
region and fishing nations have at last made a clear commitment to the establishment of a strong regional 
fisheries management organization, firmly based on the principles established in the UN Agreement. 
The draft Convention is comprehensive and inclusive in nature. While some participants remain uncom­
fortable with the level of detail that is proposed, others have expressed the view that as much detail as 
possible should be incorporated into the Convention in order to avoid later dispute in the Commission. 
Notwithstanding the level of detail in the text, the draft Convention is primarily a framework, or template, 
for better management of the fisheries of the region. The purpose of the Convention is to establish the 
necessary institutional basis for better management and to set out the legal rules for fishing in the region. 
It is the Commission itselfthat will have to deal with the most difficult and intractable issues, such as the 
reduction of over-capacity, how to allocate fishing opportunities and how to accommodate new entrants. 
For these, there can be no prescriptive or easy solutions. The region will therefore have to rely on the 
wisdom and shared commitment of the MHLC participants to fulfil the objective of long-term conserva­
tion and sustainable use ofthe resources. 
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COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERV A nON OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA 
by 
Campbell McGregor, Executive Secretaryl 
I would firstly like to thank you for inviting me to participate in the 50th anniversary celebrations of your 
Commission. 
IATTC is an organisation to which relatively new organisations such as CCSBT, can look for ideas and 
support as we grow and develop. My personal contacts with your Commission staff have been helpful 
and rewarding and I appreciate this opportunity to attend this symposium and your Commission meeting. 
BACKGROUND 
The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna formally came into existence on 20 May 
1994 when the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna came into force. The objec­
tive of the Convention is to ensure, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum 
utilisation of southern bluefin tuna. The Convention also provides that the Commission shall decide on a 
total allowable catch (TAC) and its allocation among members unless other appropriate measures are 
agreed. The Commission may if necessary decide on other additional measures. 
SBT has a wide migratory range which extends from the only known spawning ground in the Indian 
Ocean south of Indonesia, west to Africa and into the southern parts of the Atlantic Ocean and easterly 
along the west coast of Australia, through waters adjacent to southern and south eastern Australia, and to 
New Zealand and the south western part of the Pacific Ocean. Apart from the spawning area south of 
Indonesia, adult fish tend to be in the temperate waters between latitudes 30°8 and 50"8. SBT can live for 
up to 40 years and reaches maturity after about 8 years, although there is a view that full maturity may be 
later. While the Commission is primarily responsible for one species of tuna, the geographical area of 
responsibility is extensive. It also has responsibilities, where appropriate, relating to ecologically related 
species and in recent years has actively participated in introducing measures designed to minimise the 
number of sea birds taken inadvertently by long line vessels. Member countries now require the use of 
tori poles or streamers attached to lines offthe back of vessels. Experiments are also being conducted on 
alternative ways of casting bait, including casting under water. 
While the Commission formally came into existence in 1994, the formality of the Convention had been 
preceded by collaboration and cooperation on SBT between the founding members, Australia, Japan and 
New Zealand in various forms, since the 1960s. These started with informal exchanges between scien­
tists with more formal meetings commencing in the early 1980s. The commercial fishery began in the 
early 1950s with Japanese long line vessels taking SBT in fishing grounds south of Indonesia, together 
with other tropical and sub-tropical tunas. Australians started commercial operations about the same 
time but targeted surface schools ofjuvenile fish off south eastern Australia and later off southern Aus­
tralia, using pole and line or bait boats, and purse seine vessels. 
The fishery expanded rapidly during the late 1950s and 1960s with total recorded catches peaking at 
81,600 tonnes in 1961. Australia and Japan were the only countries recording catches in that period. 
The Japanese fishery gradually expanded into the temperate southern waters and improvements in han­
dling and freezing equipment resulted in SBT becoming a high value species for the sashimi market. 
Significant quantities of the adult fish were taken on the high seas as well as off Australia and New Zea­
land. 
'Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, P.O. Box 37, Deaken West, Canberra, Act 2600, 
Australia 
e-mail: cmcgregor@ccsbt.org.au 
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The catches in the SBT longline fishery reduced during the late 1960s and I 970s, on average to about 
half the peak levels of 1961. In 1971 the Japanese industry introduced voluntary restrictions on long line 
fishing operations in the Indian Ocean, the Southern Ocean and Tasman Sea after concerns over the con­
centration of fishing effort in these areas at times where spawning stock and small fish were abundant. 
During the same period the catches in the Australian surface fishery gradually increased and peaked at 
21,500 tonnes in 1982. This fishery concentrated on taking SBT from schools ofjuvenile fish passing 
through the Australian EEZ. Although the catches increased, from the late 1970s, the Australian fishery 
gradually contracted westwards into the Great Australian Bight and the south western waters of Western 
Australia. A particular concern to the three countries was the increased catch of small fish off Western 
Australia. The New Zealand scientists were also noticing a reduction in their fishery and as concern 
about these trends increased, there were calls in the early I 980s for catch restraint and a coordinated ap­
proach to management of the stock. 
During the 1980s Australian, Japanese and New Zealand scientists and fishery managers collaborated 
more closely in monitoring the state ofthe stock and through informal trilateral negotiations agreed to 
observe national catch restraints in both the long line and surface fisheries. Australia introduced an indi­
vidual transferable quota system to rationalise the fleet and maintain TACs at the agreed level. Japan and 
New Zealand also introduced annual T ACs for their respective fleets. The TAC was reduced over sev­
eral years to 11,750 tonnes in 1989 and it remained at that level for Commission members until 1997. 
Australia continued to take surface schools of SBT for canning until the late 1980s. In the early 1990s 
Japanese industry conducted a project which was aimed at transferring knowledge of longline fishing 
techniques (Tuna Longline Fisheries Development Project). These arrangements provided Australian 
fishers with the opportunity to learn long line fishing techniques to target adult fish and reduce the catch 
of smaller fish off Australia in particular. Japanese technical experts also assisted with the establishment 
oftuna farming operations in South Australia in order to manage small fish resources more rationally and 
to increase their added value. With the development of better handling and transport arrangements and 
facilities for farming juvenile SBT until they are grown to a size suitable for the sashimi market, almost 
all the Australian quota is now taken by Australian vessels for farming and dedicated to that market. 
During the 1980s, it became clear that if effective global management was to be achieved, a more formal 
arrangement was needed to support necessary research and to obtain international acceptance of the need 
to control catches. Australia, Japan and New Zealand agreed to enter into a formal arrangement for the 
conservation and optimum utilisation ofSBT in the spirit ofthe provisions of the Law ofthe Sea, which 
included provisions to encourage non-member countries with a direct interest in SBT to accede to the 
Convention. 
Although the Convention came into force in May 1994, an administrative Secretariat was not established 
until 1996. The current Secretariat is headquartered in Canberra, Australia with a staff of three. In many 
ways the CCSBT is still in the process of development. While there are currently processes in place for 
collection and exchange of information and scientific data, and scientific research and analysis, the 
Commission is examining ways of improving these processes to ensure the objective of the Convention is 
achieved. 
CHALLENGES FOR CCSBT 
Non-members 
As I indicated earlier, one of the issues that promoted the establishment of this Commission was the need 
to provide an international framework to encourage all SBT fishing countries and entities to work to­
gether in the conservation and optimum utilisation ofSBT. It is estimated that vessels from non­
members currently take in excess of 4,000 tonnes per year of SBT compared with the total catch by 
members of 11,750 tonnes. Currently no formal TAC or country allocations exist under the Convention 
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but members have voluntarily limited their commercial fishing so as not to exceed their 1997 allocations. 
Commission members have been exercising considerable restraint in the fishery since the mid 1980s in 
an effort to rebuild stocks, while catches by other fleets have been observed to be increasing in recent 
years. Industries in Australia and Japan have been required to restructure at considerable cost as a result 
of the current catch restrictions and there is concern that this effort, and further and steady stock rebuild­
ing may be jeopardised by the increased catches by non-member fleets. 
In recent years Commission members have held a series of discussions with representatives from Korea 
and Taiwan, and more recently with Indonesia, regarding membership of the Commission and coopera­
tion with its management arrangements. Representatives from Korea, Indonesia, South Africa and Tai­
wan regularly attend Commission and Scientific Committee meetings as observers and have indicated 
their willingness to participate in the framework ofconservation and management of SBT and negotia­
tions are continuing to reach agreement on an acceptable quota allocation. The establishment of ar­
rangements which will facilitate their accession to the Convention and cooperation in the management of 
SBT will greatly assist in the effective management of this species. The main area of discussion is quota 
levels for new members, which I understand is not unique to the SBT environment. 
Although its vessels do not target SBT at this stage, South Africa mentioned at the last Commission 
meeting that it had considerable interest in the work of the Commission and its efforts aimed at conserv­
ing this resource. South Africa also mentioned that it is now re\ lewing its position on acceding to the 
Convention. 
At its Sixth Annual meeting held in March 2000, the Commission adopted an Action Plan to ensure the 
objectives of the Commission were achieved, through measures including the possible use of trade­
restrictive measures consistent with Members' international obligations to address non-cooperative non­
member States/fishing entities whose vessels have been catching SBT in a manner which diminishes the 
effectiveness of the Commission's conservation and management measures. Members expect that the 
Action Plan will encourage non-member States/fishing entities to join the Commission or formally coop­
erate with the management arrangements. 
Stock assessment 
Many ofyou will be aware that in recent years CCSBT members have not been able to reach agreement 
on the annual T AC for the fishery. Stock assessments and projections of future stock status are never 
easy and SBT is no exception. I will not expand on this area today other than to say that the Commission 
is concerned that every effort be made to rebuild the stock to 1980 levels by the year 2020. 
A review ofthe Commission's scientific assessment process was undertaken by independent scientists in 
1998, and in an effort to reduce the areas of uncertainty in stock assessment and reach agreement on fu­
ture management arrangements, the Commission has initiated a number of recommendations from this 
review. While the implications of a number of recommendations are still being considered, those already 
implemented include: 
• 	 the appointment of independent Chairpersons to the Stock Assessment Group and the Scientific 
Committee, to replace persons elected to those positions from members of country delegations; 
• 	 the appointment of an Advisory Panel of five external scientists to participate in scientific meetings, 
help consolidate parties' views to facilitate consensus and report their own views to the Scientific 
Committee and the Commission; and 
• 	 preliminary discussions aimed at the development of research proposals to improve knowledge of the 
fishery and reduce levels of uncertainty in the stock assessments. 
Further work is required to establish a more robust scientific process for assessing the state of the SBT 
Stock including agreement on the assessment model structure, data sets and biological parameters to be 
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used and procedures for evaluating computer codes and incorporating new concepts and information. A 
workshop to address these and related issues was held last month in Japan. While the outcomes from the 
Workshop will need to be considered by the Commission, participants considered that a number ofposi­
tive steps had been identified to help in progressing the stock assessment. These included a program of 
work to resolve differences in the stock projection implementations, acknowledgment of the need to de­
velop a new catch-at-age matrix using revised data from the fishery and a review of the rules used in de­
veloping the current catch-at-age matrix for the early years of the fishery. 
While the Commission has set a long term objective of achieving recovery of the stock to 1980 levels by 
2020, management strategies are being reviewed, taking into account similar discussions within other 
fisheries agencies and international organisations. These range from a single one which involves rebuild­
ing stock along an agreed CPUE trajectory without declaration of reference points to a more complicated 
one with reference points. This is not an easy process, particularly with highly migratory species and a 
number of issues raised at a management strategy workshop held last month with participation of scien­
tists and managers of members ofthe Commission and external scientists, will be considered further. We 
are also interested in progress being made on these issues by other tuna Commissions. 
Statistical document program 
The extensive migratory range of SBT, coupled with the fishing activities outside the Commission's man­
agement arrangements, make it difficult to establish a clear understanding ofthe level and distribution of 
global catches and for scientists to produce accurate stock assessments. 
A high proportion of the SBT taken by non-members is exported to Japan (a member) and to obtain more 
information on these catches, the Commission recently approved a scheme for the collection of data on 
the international trade ofSBT. The scheme came into effect on I June 2000 and requires Commission 
members to accept imports ofSBT only where that importation is accompanied by a validated certificate 
from the exporter's country. The certificate is to include details of the quantity and origin of the fish be­
ing imported. 
These developments have major implications for the future direction of the CCSBT and in particular the 
administrative structure necessary to effectively implement and maintain these programs. The Commis­
sion is currently supported by a small Secretariat of three staff. The Secretariat does not currently hold 
any data sets nor are staff directly involved in the scientific work on SBT, which is currently done by 
representatives of member countries. The Commission recently agreed to the establishment of a fishery 
database in the Secretariat and a database for the Statistical Document Program as well as hiring a data­
base manager to manage these data within the Secretariat. These will be established later this year and 
will allow consolidation of the data held by Commission members and facilitate a more transparent stock 
assessment and the collection ofdata from other sources to assist in developing a better understanding of 
the fishery. 
Regional fishery bodies, and in particular those dealing with highly migratory tunas, are facing similar 
challenges and the CCSBT therefore supports a closer working relationship between the tuna commis­
sions and a broadly compatible approach to the conservation and management of tuna stocks and their 
environment. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNAS 

by 
Adolfo Ribeiro Lima, Executive Secretary I 
It is an honour to be here in Costa Rica in your company, celebrating this important occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission. 
When I was invited here, I was asked to give a presentation on what are the most pressing issues facing us 
in the Atlantic Ocean, and this is what I shall do in this brief talk. I will not limit myself to telling you 
about our problems, but I also plan to tell you about what we are doing to confront these important 
challenges. 
ICCA T is the second oldest tuna commission after the IATTC, and is based on a Convention signed in 
1969. The objective of the convention is for Contracting Parties to co-operate in maintaining the 
populations of tunas and tuna-like fishes at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch for 
food and other purposes. ICCA T and fATIC are thus similar in their mandate at the time they were 
created. 
There are important differences between the IATIC and ICC A T, however, one of which is the procedure 
for joining. If a country wishes to become a member of ICCA T all it has to do is to inform the secretariat, 
and its application is accepted immediately. In addition, a nation can become a Cooperating Non­
Contracting Party. These nations are not members of ICCAT, but they transmit data needed for stock 
assessment to ICCAT and abide by ICCAT's recommendations for management. 
Two other important differences between the two tuna Commissions have to do with size. First, there is 
the size ofthe area that we are concerned with, which covers the entire Atlantic Ocean, including the 
Mediterranean Sea. This is a rather large area, but one that is suitable to encompass the entire 
distributional range for most ofthe fish stocks that we are concerned with. The second difference in size 
has to do with how our respective secretariats have been set-up. IATTC's is a large staff intended to 
contain all of the necessary data collection and analysis capabilities in-house, either in La Jolla or in 
various field offices. In contrast, ICCA T's staff has been historically a small one in Madrid that provides 
support to meetings where members do their science and draft their recommendations. Operationally, 
then, our commissions are structured in different ways. 
The heart of ICCA T is its Standing Committee on Research and Statistics. A 1I scientific investigations are 
carried out by scientists of the member nations and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, who then meet 
in working groups or plenary sessions where they try to reach agreement by consensus on measures for 
management. After that the scientists of the various nations can provide advice to their delegations before 
the Commission meets. 
Despite the differences in geographical area of competence and in the way we do our work, I believe that 
our commissions, and indeed most regional fishery bodies, share similar problems. I like to divide these 
into three classes of problems: The first set of problems have to do with objectives or, in other words, 
with balancing resource usage against conservation. The second class of problems are those of so-called 
"allocation" issues, or who-gets-what. And, finally, the third class has to do with basing decisions on 
scientific evidence that is neither outdated nor biased. I want to tell you about these problems from our 
Atlantic perspective but first I would like to tell you a little bit more about ICC A T. 
1 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Calle Coraz6n de Maria 8, Piso 6, 28020 
Madrid, Spain 
e-mail: info@iccat.es 
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Like I said before, the ICCA T Convention dates back to 1969. Our Secretariat has been located in Madrid 
since the early 1970's. ICCAT currently has 28 Contracting Parties, 25 of which have Atlantic territories, 
and one of them is the European Community. 
About 30 species are ofdirect concern to ICC A T .The major tunas are Atlantic bluefin, yellowfin, and 
bigeye tuna. Swordfish also supports important fisheries. In addition, we are concerned with bill fishes 
such as white and blue marlins, sailfish, spearfish, mackerels and small tunas like skipjack, frigate tuna 
and Atlantic bonito. 
The stated objective of the Commission is to maintain these populations at levels which will permit the 
maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes. During our existence, we have seen the catches 
of our major species (yellowfin, bigeye, skipjack, albacore, bluefin and swordfish) increase from 290,000 
tons to 510,000 tons, an increase of 75%. Currently, our largest yields are obtained for yellowfin (147,000 
tons), skipjack (133,000 tons) and bigeye (95,000 tons). Altogether, landings for the species of our direct 
concern exceed 600,000 tons. 
For most stocks, the largest gains in catches occurred during the I970s and early 1980s with the 
geographical expansion of long-line and purse-seine fisheries. For example, catches ofyellow fin tuna 
increased almost in direct proportion to the areas searched by tropical purse seiners; a similar expansion 
occurred in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. But we also have observed increases in catches in recent 
times. Some fisheries have also experienced large gains during the last decade due to changes in fishing 
practices or increases in fishing intensity, or both. One such example has to do with tropical tunas and the 
use of FADs, which have proliferated in number and in design. 
Now I would like to tum your attention to one of our main classes of challenges: Balancing resource 
usage against conservation. 
As I mentioned before, the objective ofthe Commission is to maintain the stocks at levels capable of 
producing maximum sustainable catches, or MSY. This objective in itself implies conservation, in that the 
potential for MSY has to be maintained over time. 
In practice, fishery development has taken precedence over stock conservation. That is, in the face of 
uncertainty about stock status, catches have been maintained or even increased in some cases. In 
retrospect, some such increases have not been dangerous and have obviously benefited the fisheries. For 
instance, back in the early 1970s our scientists told us that the yellowfin stocks were being fished at the 
maximum and, yet, as the fisheries expanded in area of operation, the landings continued to increase, and 
the scientists' estimates ofMSY also increased. 
Today, about one-half of the stocks that we monitor through stock assessments are below our current 
estimates of the MSY popUlation size. It is possible that, like in the yellowfin example ljust gave you, the 
scientists are sometimes wrong and there is a potential for further increases in catches. But, it is also 
possible that they are correct. I don't know. 
What I do know, is that now there is much more pressure to give greater consideration to conservation 
than we ever had in the past, almost infinitely more pressure than there was 30 or 50 years ago. This 
pressure is evident within our Contracting Parties, it is evident in the makeup of the delegations of 
observers to our meetings, it is evident in the media and campaigns by NGOs, and it is particularly 
evident in recent international texts such as the Code ofConduct for Responsible Fisheries and in the 
agreement for the implementation of the Law of the Sea as it relates to highly migratory fish stocks. With 
this presence, there is now much pressure to react differently to uncertainty. 
With this type of pressure, I doubt that the yellow fin expansion would have happened as it did. On the 
other hand, you have all seen too many stories of fish stock collapses all over the world and of the 
disastrous economic consequences that they have spawned. I believe that this increased emphasis on 
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conservation will help us avoid collapses of our own and that it will also help us to rebuild the stocks that 
are below their maximum potential. 
One very real impact that conservation pressures have had on ICC A T is that it has pushed us to make our 
science even more transparent than it already was. Our Secretariat is putting in place systems to better 
document our data and assessments, and to carry out greater quality control checks. I can safely say that 
we make every effort to make sure that all of the known scientific evidence be made available to our 
constituents and to the public at large. 
But, to me, the greatest impact that the pressure for conservation has had on ICCA T is that it has pushed 
the Commission to look for innovative ways to make an impact. Almost from the beginning of our 
existence, we have had conservation measures that have made perfect sense on paper but that have been 
ineffective for one or another reason. For example, we have not had much success with minimum size 
restrictions. 
In the last decade, however, our Commission has pioneered new types of conservation measures that 
seem to be working rather well. In 1992, the Commission recommended the creation of a Bluefin Tuna 
Statistical Document for tracking the imports and exports of frozen Atlantic bluefin, our most 
overexploited resource. During the next six years this recommendation was amended so that it would 
cover fresh as well as frozen bluefin, and so that it would close some loopholes. Today, the bluefin tuna 
statistical document seems a very effective tool to track the catches of this rather important resource. 
The Commission has also been a pioneer in recommending non-discriminatory trade restrictive measures 
on species ofconcern, primarily to reduce the activities of Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported fishing 
vessels, also known as IUU vessels. These IUU boats are a major problem for all of our Commissions 
because they erode the capacity of conservation measures to work adequately, and because they are so 
highly mobile between the various oceans. Perhaps our Commission's leadership in applying trade 
measures will lead to a uniform, global treatment of this problem. 
I would Iike to tell you now about our second major class of problems, which has to do with allocation. 
Perhaps all of the problems of managing fisheries can be traced one way or another to an issue of 
allocation, or who-gets-what. The allocation issues are ubiquitous, have been there since long before 
ICCA T or IATTC were created, and will likely continue to exist as long as societies change. When the 
Commission started its operations, there were 9 member nations, primarily those with distant water or 
coastal fleets operating in the Atlantic. Today, we have 28 Contracting Parties, which is counting the 
European Community as one, so we have more than tripled our size. But also of importance is the fact 
that our members are of a different makeup, with several coastal nations that do not have developed their 
own fisheries substantially but-who would like a greater share of the resource allocation. 
Our Commission created a working group with the purpose of examining the criteria that ought to be 
considered in the future if the allocation is to be re-addressed. This is a difficult task in which issues as 
contrasting as historical rights versus coastal rights are being addressed. The working group has met twice 
and has made progress in bringing to the table the various interests and points of view. 
The last class of challenges that I want to mention to you today is that of keeping up with fishing 
technology and fishing practices. 
Already, the business of collating and analysing fishery data in our Commission lags 8 months to I year 
behind the act of fishing. But the problem is much worse when we realize too late that we should have 
collected a given type of information that is crucial to the analyses. Such is often the case with what we 
call "fishing power", or the ability to monitor the fisheries' actual impact on the fish stocks. 
One important example that affects all of us has to do with the use of Fish Aggregating Devices. As I 
mentioned before, the largest recent increases of tuna catches in the Atlantic are due directly to the use of 
F ADs. But we don't know how many FADs there are, nor how to relate one FAD to a day's fishing on a 
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purse seiner. Even worse don't really know how FADs "work" to attract tunas or if F ADs have an effect 
on tuna behavior. Meanwhile, while we do not have good data on FADs, their nature keeps changing: 
how they are used, how they are constructed, what equipment they have. This vicious circle adds to the 
uncertainty in a very negative way. 
I do not want to make it sound as if the FAD phenomenon is very unique as a technological challenge, 
because it is not. Similar things have happened in the past with the introduction ofnew searching 
technologies for other fisheries. But the point is, the more time our Commission takes to understand what 
is going on, the worse our ability is to respond in time ifneeded. 
With regards to technology, it is up to our Contracting Parties to collect the data that are necessary to 
perform the best analyses possible. 
On that note, I would like to wrap-up this presentation by reminding you of our three challenges: 
Balancing conservation against usage, allocation ofusage, and sound monitoring. These challenges are 
not new nor are they unique to ICCAT. Their solution is very difficult, but we are taking firm steps 
towards dealing with them. 
I would like to finish by saying that, without regional commissions like ours, which are concerned with 
these highly-migratory stocks on the basis of large geographical areas, the problems could be much worse 
than they are. 
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ISSUES. PROBLEMS, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 

MANAGEMENT OF TUNAS DURING THE 21ST CENTURY 

by 

James Joseph, fonner Directorl 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
INTRODUCTION 
I have been asked to speak about the future of tuna management, particularly with respect to international 
arrangements for management. 
At best, it is difficult to accurately forecast any event, and with tuna it is even more so. The tuna fisheries 
ofthe world are always changing, and the politics governing their management are changing even more. 
Therefore, in this review I will rely on my experience over the past 40 years, and attempt to present ideas 
regarding what I think many of the important issues and problems of tuna fisheries and their management 
will be during the forthcoming years and what sort of institutional arrangements might be necessary for 
their proper management, but I will not attempt to forecast events. 
Tuna represent an important natural resource. Catches of the principal market species, skipjack, yellow­
fin, bigeye, albacore, and bluefin, have ranged between 3.1 and?6 million tons in recent years. This 
represents about 4 percent ofthe world catch of marine species, but much more than that in tenns of 
value. Most of these principal market species, with the exception of skipjack, are considered fully ex­
ploited, and in some cases they are overexploited. 
Tuna are, of course, a renewable living resource, and the rate that humans harvest them affects their 
abundance and ability to sustain catches. To ensure healthy resources and sustained harvests, we must 
have knowledge of their biology, and of their relationships to the other animals they interact with, includ­
ing humans. We must also know about the effects of natural factors on their abundance. Once we have 
such knowledge we must put it to use through the appropriate institutional arrangements so as to ensure 
that the resource is managed in a sound manner. Over the last several decades we have had some suc­
cesses and some failures in trying to do this for the tunas. 
One ofthe special problems in attempting to manage tunas is the fact that they are highly migratory, trav­
elling from waters under the jurisdiction of one nation to those under the jurisdiction of another of another 
and to the high seas beyond the jurisdiction of any nation. This migratory behavior requires that nations 
work together to properly manage them. This requirement has been codified in a number of international 
instruments. 
We have listened today to several speakers who have told us about some of these international arrange­
ments for the management of highly-migratory species. The oldest of these is the Inter-American Tropi­
cal Tuna Commission (fA TTC), an organization that was created in 1949, long before there were any in­
ternational instruments dealing with the unique needs of tuna management and the requirements for inter­
national cooperation. It was, in fact, the lA TTC that provided much of the scientific infonnation and 
much of the experience that led to the international guidelines that were developed for managing tunas. 
Such guidelines were first treated in 1958 during negotiations to draft the 1 st United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. The first Director of the Commission, Dr. M. B. Schaefer, served as a technical 
advisor to the United Nations on matters related to living marine resources, and his advice did much to 
develop present policy for the management of tunas. Although there was never a final approval of a 1958 
convention, nor a subsequent 1960 convention, the principle that tunas are highly-migratory species and 
that international cooperation is necessary for their proper management was finnly established. This 
I 2790 Palomino Circle, La Jolla, California, 92037, USA 
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principle, which was codified in Article 64 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, called on states 
to cooperate in the management of tunas through regional bodies if they existed, and, if they did not, to 
create them. 
With this mandate in mind, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (IC­
CAT) was created in 1969, the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) in 
1995, and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) in 1998. The only area of the world in which there 
is a major tuna fishery and for which there is no Article 64-type tuna body is the western Pacific, the area 
of the world's largest tuna fisheries. However, over the past few years, nations with interests in the re­
gion have been in negotiations to create such a body, and agreement on a Convention is likely to occur 
during the year 2000. The problems that all ofthese international organizations will face in the future 
will be very similar, and the solutions will be nearly the same. 
The remainder of this presentation will deal with those problems and possible solutions. 
THE SITUATION TODAY 
There are several problems concerning tunas that are important today and will continue to be important in 
the future. Information necessary to answer the questions raised by these problems will be necessary in 
the years to come if we are to be able to adequately manage the tunas and the ecosystems to which they 
belong. These problems can be divided into two broad categories: I) the scientific study oftunas and the 
fisheries for them, and 2) the management of those fisheries. 
Science 
[t has already been mentioned that a prerequisite to proper management is knowledge concerning the re­
source to be managed, which, in this case, is tunas. 
Human curiosity about tunas, their behavior, growth, movements, reproduction, mortalities, and a whole 
array of other facets of their lives, has probably existed since the first person sat on the beach gazing out 
at the sea. Indeed, more than 2000 years ago Aristotle wrote in his HISTORIA ANIMALIA about the 
behavior and other aspects of the biology of bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean Sea. He speculated on 
their rates of growth, their migrations, their reproduction, on what factors contributed to their catchability, 
and to their desirability as a food item. Some of the things he wrote about them were accurate, but most 
were not. Although modem science has gathered much information on tunas, some of the questions 
posed by Aristotle are stil1 unanswered today. 
Our knowledge of the biology of tunas has increased since the creation of the first tuna commission in 
1949. We know that many of the tunas undertake extensive migrations, some crossing oceans several 
times during their lives. However, we are uncertain of their rates of mixing, and such knowledge is nec­
essary if we are to understand the effects of fishing in one area on the fish of another area. A variety of 
techniques has been used to acquire this sort of information. There have been many studies utilizing ge­
netic information to define genetically-homogeneous populations. However, genetic studies are of lim­
ited value regarding mixing, because it theoretically requires only very low mixing rates over very broad 
areas to maintain genetic homogeneity. The use of physical attributes, such as meristic and morphometric 
characteristics, also have been used to infer population structure. Such physical characteristics are often 
considered to be genetically controlled, but, in fact, they may be affected by environmental conditions, 
and therefore may be of limited value. Tagging data have been used to measure movements and rates of 
mixing. Large numbers of tunas have been tagged since the early I 950s, but many of these experiments 
have been on a limited and opportunistic basis, and, though they have revealed interesting facts about the 
movements of individual tunas, they have not been very useful in estimating rates of mixing. Large-scale, 
well-designed tagging experiments are needed to estimate mixing rates on a scale oftime and area fine 
enough for use in analytical models of tuna populations that can be used for management. Because of the 
high costs of such experiments and the broad geographic areas that must be covered, international coop­
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eration among scientists and regional organizations will be necessary if future experiments are to be suc­
cessful. 
Rates of growth and sizes at age have been estimated for several species of tuna. Most often the rates of 
growth have been estimated by studying length samples showing the progression of modal lengths 
through time, but, on occasion, tagging studies have provided limited information with which to estimate 
growth rates. There are limitations to its usefulness the study of modal progressions to estimate the 
growth rates of tunas because, as the fish age their growth slows, and it becomes difficult to separate the 
modes into age groups. Some tunas lay down daily markers on their otoliths, and this fact has proven 
useful in aging them, but the techniques used to identifY these marks and age the fish are slow, tedious, 
and somewhat subjective, so they do not lend themselves to aging large numbers of fish in an efficient 
manner. There is a need to streamline the techniques in order to make this methodology a more practical 
tool. Also, research is needed to examine the possibilities of developing some other quick, but accurate, 
way ofaging tunas, perhaps using physiological or microbiological methods. However, due to shortfalls 
in funding, there has been little effort directed toward this sort of research. Ifwe are to make progress 
along these lines in the future, concerted joint efforts will be necessary. 
Probably the single most important parameter for understanding the dynamics of tuna populations is the 
rate at which they die from natural causes. Over the many years that tunas have been studied, few esti­
mates of natural mortality have been made, and these are probably not very accurate. This is especially 
true regarding age-specific mortality. Most of these estimates have been made either by examining the 
dynamics of changing age groups or from limited tagging experiments. There is an urgent need to expand 
these studies, to design and execute large-scale tagging experiments with the specific objective ofestimat­
ing mortality, and to conduct exploratory physiological and microbiological studies of senescence that 
might reflect rates of mortality. 
Tunas, being pelagic at all stages of their lives, are profoundly influenced by changes in their environ­
ment. Ifwe are to understand fluctuations in distribution and abundance of tunas, we must understand 
how the biological, chemical, and physical characteristics of the ocean affect them. Tuna scientists have 
worked closely with oceanographers over the last century, and have learned many things about how cer­
tain ocean and global climatic features affect tuna distribution and abundance. It seems reasonably clear 
that the occurrence ofglobal phenomenon, such as EI Nino and anti-EI Nino events, affect the abundance 
and distribution of many species of tuna. Likewise, changes in smaller-scaled features, such as eddies 
and fronts, seem to play an important role in determining the distribution and availability of tunas. With 
the advent of satellite technology, an increasingly better understanding ofthe dynamics of these physical 
phenomena will be possible. Broad cooperation among tuna scientists and oceanographers throughout 
much ofthe world will be required to make maximum use of this information for studying fluctuations in 
tuna abundance and distribution. 
All of the biological and environmental data that have been obtained over the years is utilized with 
mathematical models to describe the dynamics oftuna populations, their rates of growth, their abundance, 
and what levels ofcatch they can support. Although it has been well understood that several species of 
tuna are taken in a single fishery, and that the tunas interact with other animals in the ecosystem to which 
they belong, most ofthe models used to describe their dynamics have been applied to a single species. 
This is obviously a very simplistic approach, because removing one species most likely has either a posi­
tive or negative effect on the other species with which they interact. For example, if adult yellowfin prey 
on young skipjack, then removing yellow fin by fishing could benefit skipjack. Likewise, if yellowfin and 
dolphins compete for the same food, then removing yellowfin by fishing could give the dolphins an ad­
vantage and they could become more abundant than they had been before yellowfin were harvested. Be­
cause of the great importance of this subject, intensive study of these relationships is needed, and the in­
formation gathered should be utilized in models that attempt to describe the multitude of species in the 
fishery or, better yet, the ecosystem in general. The first inroads into developing such an understanding 
and the first attempts at modeling the ecosystem to which tunas belong, utilizing such tools as Ecosim and 
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Ecopath, are now underway. However, to make substantial progress in this field will require a broad 
based approach to the problem, in which scientists and scientific institutions from around the globe par­
ticipate. Notwithstanding the fact that single-species models have many shortcomings and limitations, 
they should not be abandoned for the more sophisticated multi species and ecosystem models until the lat­
ter have been shown to be superior. 
The necessity of having adequate statistics on the catch and fishing effort generated to make that catch is 
fundamental. For many ofthe major tuna fisheries of the world, adequate statistics of catch and effort by 
species and time and area strata are collected for use in analysis and modeling. For others, however, ade­
quate statistics are lacking. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that some international 
organizations are not empowered nor funded to collect statistics themselves, but receive statistics from 
their member nations. Some of those nations, although they have tuna fleets, do not have the infrastruc­
tures or institutions capable of collecting adequate statistics. In other cases, some nations with tuna fish­
eries do not, or cannot, belong to international tuna organizations, and therefore do not provide statistics 
to those organizations. Still other nations fish in areas where there is no international organization and do 
not collect statistics ofcatch and effort, or, ifthey do collect them, do not make them available to the in­
ternational community of scientists that has responsibility for such fisheries. No matter the reason, there 
is a need to improve the collection and availability of tuna statistics. 
There is also a need to resolve a problem of species identification regarding bigeye and yellowfin tuna. 
Although it possible to clearly differentiate between the two species when individual specimens can be 
closely examined, it is difficult to differentiate between them when they are mixed in large quantities. 
There is and will be a strong need to develop rapid means of doing this. These problems of species iden­
tification, and ofcollection (including the protocols for collection) of catch statistical information are 
common throughout most of the tuna fisheries of the world. As we move into the 21st Century there is a 
need to develop new technology for collecting catch, effort, species composition, and size composition 
data in a more accurate and efficient manner. Much ofthe new technology associated with computers, 
digital imagery, lasers, etc., should make it possible to collect accurate information on a nearly real-time 
basis. However, widespread .cooperation among organizations and nations around the globe will be nec­
essary if real progress is to be made. 
In addition to these aforementioned scientific problems that will be with us through much ofthis century, 
there are several other pressing problems relating to rational management of tuna fisheries that must be 
resolved. These are discussed in the following section. 
Management 
Tunas have a tendency to associate with objects in the sea, dolphins, floating tree trunks, and many other 
types of drifting debris. Fishermen have developed fish-aggregating devices (FADs) to attract concentra­
tions of tunas and thereby improve their fishing success. They catch large quantities of skipjack, yellow­
fin, and bigeye around FADs. Most of the tunas they capture are smalL Catching tunas, particularly yel­
lowfin and bigeye, at small sizes reduces the potential production from the population being exploited. In 
addition to the tunas, many other species of fish, turtles, and mammals associate with FADs. Much of 
this bycatch has no commercial value and is returned to the sea, most often dead. FAD fishing has in­
creased tremendously since the late 1980s, and has accounted for increased catches of small yellowfin and 
bigeye, and much of the world catch of skipjack. There is much concern that this increased FAD fishing 
is reducing the abundance of large yellowfin and bigeye, causing growth overfishing, and adversely af­
fecting the ecosystem to which the tunas belong. This has led to efforts to limit the amount of F AD fish­
ing. Indeed, the first efforts to limit such fishing were voluntarily instituted by the industry itself. Since 
these first voluntary limitations, governments have set similar limitations through international tuna or­
ganizations. Though these limits reduce the catches of small yellowfin and bigeye, which are already 
heavily exploited, they also reduce the catch of skipjack, the primary species taken on FADs and a species 
that is not fully exploited in many areas where they are fished. These problems ofFAD fishing are com­
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mon to all areas of the world's oceans where purse-seine fishing is prosecuted, and they are growing as 
more vessels fish in this manner. Methods of fishing that allow fishermen to select the species they want, 
but not those that they don't want, should be developed. Most notably there is a need to develop a way to 
catch the skipjack associated with FADs, without capturing the small yellowfin, bigeye, and myriad of 
other bycatch species. This will be a major task for fishermen, scientists, and nations to deal with in the 
coming years. 
In addition to the bycatch taken by the FAD fishery, there are also other problems of by catch facing the 
tuna fisheries in the coming year. Probably the most notable bycatch problem has been that ofdolphins 
taken in the yellowfin tuna fishery of the eastern Pacific Ocean. This was probably the leading environ­
mental tFade issue of the last century. Although the problem is mostly solved from the biological point of 
view, since mortality ofdolphins caused by the fishery has been reduced to nearly zero, it continues to 
affect international trade in tuna. Similar problems are associated with other types of fisheries, particu­
larly some of the longline fisheries that take endangered seabirds and turtles. There needs to be a "critical 
mass" of scientific and technical effort directed on a global scale to addressing these problems. If in the 
coming years solutions are not found, there will be further impacts on "free trade" in tuna and tuna prod­
ucts that will have serious economic and political impacts on governments and industry. 
Many of the world's tuna fisheries are fully or overexploited. There are limits on the catches of northern 
bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean and on southern bluefin globally. Closures to FAD fishing have been 
instituted in the Atlantic and eastern Pacific Oceans. There are limits on the catches of yellow fin and 
bigeye tunas in the eastern Pacific and efforts to limit their catches in other areas. The need for regulation 
is the result of increasing fishing effort from a large global fleet of vessels. In many of these controlled 
fisheries there is more fishing capacity than is necessary to take the allowable harvest. There is concern 
that, as excess capacity grows, the fishery will become less profitable for the harvesters and it wi II be­
come more difficult for nations to reach agreement as to how to manage the fisheries. As a result, there 
have been efforts to limit fishing capacity and in fact the United Nations has called for such limitations in 
global fishing capacity. Two commissions, the lATTC and ICCAT, have taken steps to limit capacity, 
and are struggling with the development of criteria to allocate this capacity among participants and na­
tions. Just how these criteria should be defined and applied is unclear, but they will almost certainly in­
volve, inter alia, historic involvement in the fishery and adjacency to the resource. When capacity is al­
located it follows that the catch is allocated to a degree as well. Some nations are interested in allocating 
catch, rather than fishing capacity. The same problems of allocation and of determining criteria for allo­
cation of catch exist with respect to capacity. In the coming years the various international tuna organiza­
tions will have to find ways ofdealing with these problems if they are to be successful in managing the 
resources for which they are responsible. Because the problems are similar in all areas, and excess capac­
ity can flow from one area to another, successful limitations in capacity in one area cannot be achieved 
without considering the consequences in other areas. 
In the past there have been several fisheries for which the available scientific information indicated heavy 
exploitation, but for which controls were not instituted because the scientific evidence was considered to 
be inconclusive. This has resulted in some of these fisheries being heavily overexploited. Because of 
concern over such situations, several international instruments have called on states to be more cautious 
when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. They note that the absence of adequate scientific 
information should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management 
measures. Although adequate information is available to determine whether some tuna stocks are fully 
exploited or overexploited, there are others for which the data necessary for such a determination are 
lacking. In those cases nations are encouraged, indeed mandated, to take action to avert overexploitation, 
even if such action could eventually prove to be overly conservative. This "precautionary approach" will 
undoubtedly influence how tuna fisheries will be managed in the future, but just how it will be applied is 
uncertain. To ensure that the approach is instituted in an efficient and timely manner, it will be necessary 
to develop a set of standards and reference points for implementing management controls. Since the 
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problems are common among most fisheries and areas, it would be most efficient to develop such stan­
dards and reference points on a global basis. 
Traditionally, the decision-making process regarding conservation measures in international bodies has 
been carried out with some degree of secrecy, with only governmental representatives and their scientific 
advisors involved in the process. With the expansion of non-governmental organizations from industry 
and the environmental and consumer communities, this "closed" process has come under criticism. Re­
cently there has been a tendency for more openness to the decision-making process used to formulate and 
monitor tuna management measures. A number of international instruments have mandated that transpar­
ency become a part of the process of making management decisions. Whereas committees and fora for 
making these decisions have been the domain of government representatives, they are increasingly being 
joined by non-governmental organizations. Transparency will become even more the norm in the future. 
In addition to transparency in the decision-making process, will be a need for openness in ensuring com­
pliance with whatever regulations or controls may be implemented. New and better means of collecting 
data and monitoring the fisheries will be necessary to provide the information needed to ensure compli­
ance with regulations and collect the scientific data necessary to make the management decisions that will 
be required in the future. Observers will become more common on high-seas fishing trips. They will col­
lect information on catches, both retained and discarded, and other information on the vessels' activities, 
and this information will be used to assess potential overfishing problems and to monitor compliance with 
regulations. Much of the information collected will be transmitted to shore stations on a regular and fre­
quent basis, so that real-time management decisions can be made. Vessels without observers may be re­
quired to carry electronic devices to monitor their positions and fishing activities, and this information 
would be transmitted via satellite to shore stations, where it would be used to monitor the effectiveness of 
management controls. These measures may be regarded as unwarranted intrusions into the privacy and 
freedom of fishers, but the ever-increasing pressure on the resources of the sea, the need to conserve them 
for the future, and the ever-increasing influence of non-governmental organizations, make them likely to 
be continued and increased. 
The manner in which tuna fisheries are exploited, and the means for managing and conserving the world's 
tuna resources, are changing. Many fishing activities traditionally considered the "right" of individuals 
and nations will be regarded in a different light in years to come. The freedoms enjoyed in the past will 
be gradually replaced by controls and limitations as increasing demand is placed on the resources of the 
sea. This may be perceived as a step backward from the point of view of freedom to exploit, but should 
be seen as a step forward from the point ofview of rational management of the resources and the fisheries 
for them. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
As they are now 
There are currently four international tuna bodies, and a fifth will most likely be created in the near future. 
When the new one is created for the western Pacific, most of the areas in the world in which tunas are 
found will be covered by regional tuna bodies. The geographical areas of responsibility for the bodies 
vary. Some, such as the IOTC and ICCAT, cover oceans, the CCSBT's mandate applies to the southern 
bluefin tuna, wherever it occurs, and the fATIC is restricted to the eastern Pacific Ocean. Although still 
uncertain, the area ofthe new western Pacific body will cover much of the western and central Pacific, 
and possibly extend into the eastern Pacific, overlapping with the area ofthe IATTC. 
Each of the bodies has responsibility for most of the tuna and billfish species that occur in its convention 
waters. The IATIC has responsibility for the baitfishes of the eastern Pacific that are used to harvest tu­
nas and other types of fishes taken by tuna fishing vessels. The bycatch species are notably included in 
this classification. The fATIC also has some responsibilities for the marine mammals that are taken in 
association with tunas in the eastern Pacific Ocean. 
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All ofthe organizations have basically the same objective, which is to offer management advice to the 
member governments regarding the species under their jurisdiction. Just how the different bodies develop 
this advice differs among the organizations. The oldest of the bodies, the IATTC, employs a director and 
an independent staff of internationally-recruited scientists who are responsible for collecting and analyz­
ing catch statistical data and other biological and environmental information on the tuna fisheries of the 
eastern Pacific. Based on these analyses, management advice is provided to the plenary body of the 
Commission. Recommendations for management are formulated by the Plenary, based on the advice re­
ceived from the Director and his staff and transmitted to the governments. 
The other tuna bodies do not employ independent staffs of scientists, but appoint secretariats to coordinate 
the activities of the commissions. In these other bodies the collection and analysis of catch statistical and 
biological information is the responsibility of national scientists who meet through committees to com­
pare their analyses and make assessments of the various stocks. The results oftheir work, including stock 
assessment advice, are reported to the Plenary. In order to enhance data collection and analysis, ICCA T 
and the IOTC are moving in the direction of acquiring additional permanent scientific staff members. 
Concurrently, in the IATTC there is more participation of non-staff scientists in working groups and spe­
cial scientific committees to review research results; however, nearly all data collection and analysis con­
tinues to be conducted by the permanent staff of the IATTC. 
Although the format used to fulfill their respective obligations differs among the various bodies, the cir­
cumstances and problems in all of the bodies are quite similar, indeed almost identical. 
The species covered by each body are nearly the same. Most of them are highly migratory, which re­
quires that for any conservation action to be successful it must apply to all areas where the fish occur. 
This does not create much of a problem for ICCA T or the IOTC, although there may be some movement 
of fish between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. In the Pacific 
the potential problems are more complex, since movements between the west and east are more pro­
nounced for many of the species. This means that there must be a great deal of cooperation and collabo­
ration among the various bodies, particularly the IATTC and the new western Pacific organization. 
Not only are the fish themselves highly migratory, but the vessels that hunt them are migratory too. They 
are capable ofmoving from the jurisdiction ofone organization to that of another with great ease. It is 
not uncommon for a single vessel to move between oceans in a single year, or to move from the eastern 
boundary of one ocean to the western boundary of the same ocean several times in the same year. There­
fore a management action taken by one regional body should not be taken without considering the conse­
quences of that action on other fisheries and other bodies. 
The tuna market is international. Tuna products move throughout this world market on a regular basis 
and with great ease. The price paid for raw tuna destined for canning, discounted for transportation costs, 
is nearly the same world-wide. An increase in catch in one area, or a reduction in another, perhaps due to 
the enactment of management measures, has a ripple effect throughout all areas and markets. 
As mentioned in the earlier sections of this report, the problems facing tuna fisheries are similar in nearly 
all areas where tuna fisheries occur. The problems of FAD fishing (catches of unmarketable tunas and 
species other than tunas) are common to all purse-seine FAD fisheries. Obviously the solutions will be 
the same too. A growing fishing capacity and excess fishing effort is also common to most tuna fisheries. 
Solutions cannot be found while ignoring other areas and other fisheries. Ifvessel capacity or fishing ef­
fort is limited in one fishery, there is a tendency for the excess to migrate to other areas, creating or exac­
erbating similar problems there. The issues of allocation offishing capacity or harvest, in face of limita­
tions, are the same in nearly all fisheries; therefore the same difficulties would be encountered in the de­
velopment of a set of criteria, and a format for implementation of such allocations, for any other area. 
The problems of collecting catch and effort statistics are similar in nearly all fisheries. In fact, the same 
type of data is collected by different organizations as the same vessel passes through the areas of respon­
53 

sibility ofthe respective organizations. A single vessel during a fishing year may be required to provide 
the same type ofdata, but in different formats, to several organizations in a single year as it moves among 
fishing areas. 
The need for a broader approach 
For all of these reasons, it has been my opinion for a long time that a single, global tuna body would make 
sense. That body could provide a focal point for coordination among nations in a number of respects. It 
seems redundant for each organization to maintain its own separate data base, group of technicians, and 
so forth, to monitor the activities of vessels as they move from area to area. It would be far more efficient 
to place responsibility for collecting catch and effort statistics and size composition information in one 
global body. Then a single cadre oftechnicians could collect the required statistical data from the fleets, 
no matter where they operated. Also, a single depository could be maintained where data would be read­
ily accessible to scientists and governments. Management recommendations formulated under the aus­
pices of a global body could be designed to minimize effects of regulatory actions in the area of one fish­
ery, on fisheries in other areas. A global body would be in the best position to produce long-term solu­
tions to the difficult problems of catch and capacity limitations. Some national fleets fish on two or three 
major fishing grounds during a single year, while other less mobile fleets are restricted to more regional 
patterns of exploitation. When making allocations, consideration would be given to whether any of the 
participant fleets fish in other areas, and this would be recognized in making such allocations. 
There are numerous other reasons, in my opinion, why a global body would make sense, not the least of 
which would be that there would be cost savings because of an increase in efficiency. A major criticism 
expressed in opposition to formulating a global body is that it would be too large and too unwieldy. This 
does not appear to me to be an insurmountable problem. Mechanisms for dealing with some issues on a 
regional or species basis could be developed. Ifthere were a propensity to move in the direction of a 
global body, the move would necessarily be slow and progress in steps. The first step would be to ad­
dress the problems that will probably develop in the Pacific Ocean. As already mentioned the fleets in 
that ocean regularly travel between the western-central and eastern Pacific Oceans, and there is some mix­
ing of fish of these two areas: For any management scheme to be effective, there would have to be a great 
deal of cooperation and coordination between the two bodies. Particularly complicating is the fact that 
the new organization is proposing boundaries for their Convention waters that overlap with the already 
established boundaries of the IATTC. Once the convention establishing the western Pacific organization 
enters into force and the Commission becomes operable, there will be a need to establish some sort of a 
permanent coordinating committee that harmonizes the work of the two organizations. Provision should 
be made in the respective conventions of the two organizations for the establishment, responsibilities, and 
functioning ofthe committee. It is my opinion that as the two organizations work together they will coa­
lesce their responsibilities and eventually merge into a single organization. That tendency may continue 
toward the evolution of a global body. 
The world is becoming increasingly "smaller," greater demands are made on our natural resources, and 
our management institutions must adjust to these changing conditions if they are to meet their responsi­
bilities. 
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